[Tlc] Dont forget to visit Siam PetitionOnLine and sign it, if you please.
Charnvit Kasetsiri
charnvitkasetsiri at yahoo.com
Fri Apr 4 13:31:22 PDT 2008
Thank you.
Dont forget to visit Siam PetitionOnLine and sign it, if you please.
http://www.petitiononline.com/SIAM2008/petition.html,
http://www.petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?siam2007&1
Charnvit
justinm at ucr.edu wrote:
FYI. See attached.
Best,
jm
From: Albert Valentine <sophillyboy at hotmail.com>
Subject: Thailand-Military: Building Three New Bases in Southern Thailand
Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2008 02:42:22 +0000
.hmmessage P { margin:0px; padding:0px } body.hmmessage { FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma } .hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px}body.hmmessage{FONT-SIZE: 10pt;FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma} I had no idea the Thais were considering this. I've been busy, so I haven't really been reading the local fish wraps, but I don't think this has hit the local papers yet. Once it does, I don't see how this is going to 'stabilize' the region [curious how the general population feels and of course the southern population]. I personally think this is going to create more problems on MANY levels. As we know, this is only going to antagonize the southern insurgents and the southern Thai-Malay-Muslims, the same population that does not trust the central Thai-Buddhists. Think that building three (3) additional military bases in southern Thailand is going to make them warm up any time soon?
R/
Al
Source: STRATFOR.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Not sure if you guys have seen this?
Thailand: Hope for Security in the South
April 1, 2008 | 2202 GMT
Thai soldiers patrol while checking security at a Buddhist temple in Pattani province
Summary
The Thai military has announced a plan to open three new military bases and training camps in the
southern provinces with a strategy to stabilize the region by 2009. That this plan is being
considered seriously suggests that reconciliation between the military and former Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra�s supporters is under way. Increased military and police cooperation in
the south will mean a short-term increase in violence but eventual stability.
Analysis
As part of a strategy to stabilize Thailand�s southern provinces, Thai army chief Gen. Anupong
Paochinda announced March 27 that the military is renewing plans to construct three new bases of
operation in the troubled region. This step is part of a greater plan to restore peace in the
restive south by 2009. The military�s announcement comes just three months after a return to
civilian government rule, which suggests a level of cooperation between the military and the
government that signifies an end to their feuding of the last several years. An end to feuding in
Bangkok means that progress might finally be possible in the troubled south.
In 2004, then-Prime Minister Thaksin � a former police officer � sent police to Thailand�s southern
provinces to replace the military. His reason was that the military had lost the people�s trust
after attacking a mosque and being responsible for the death of several Muslim suspects during
Ramadan. Violence continued in the south after the police took over, and Thaksin�s decision to
replace the military exacerbated the struggle between the military and the police. In addition to
economic troubles, Thaksin�s decision to withdraw the military caused a rift between the civilian
and military leaders, and his administration was eventually toppled in 2006.
After some hesitation, the military sent an additional 30,000 troops to the south, but with little
effect. The new civilian government � which embodies the tacit return of Thaksin�s influence � and
the military are seeking to stabilize Thailand�s international image and economy, which means that
the violence in the south that has led to almost 3,000 deaths since 2004 must be addressed. If
Thaksin is indeed increasing his influence behind the scenes in Bangkok, the fact that the military
is stepping up its control over the south is a sign that the former prime minister has come to an
agreement with his military rivals. If the civilian government and the military can come to a
political agreement in Bangkok, then the military and the police will be better able to cooperate in
combating violence in the south � a must if the security situation in the area is to improve.
The violence in the south involves religious and ethnic tensions, but also corrupt police (which is
why military involvement is key), drug smugglers and organized criminals connected to the military
(which is why police involvement is key). If Anupong�s plan is to have any effect, he needs a broad
coalition of political support � and if he is to do it by the end of 2009, he will need to use tough
tactics. The Thai military has approved the use of some of its helicopters and planes, which will
provide support to both its soldiers and police forces � a sign that the two institutions are at
least attempting to cooperate.
The placement of military bases in Thailand�s south ensures that troops will be able to respond to
violence quickly and with determined force. And with relative political stability in Bangkok, the
military can focus its energy on containing violence in the south with less fear of being stymied
politically. If the military and police forces in the south can cooperate as their political patrons
in Bangkok seem to be doing, they could well reduce the scale of violence in the south.
_______________________________________________
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Charnvit Kasetsiri, Ph.D.
Senior Adviser and Lecturer
Southeast Asian Studies Program
Thammasat University
Bangkok 10200, Siam (not Thailand)
Secretary
Social Sciences and Humanities Textbook Foundation
413/38 Arun-Amarin Rd.,
Bangkok 10700, Siam
handphone 089-476-0505
e-mail: charnvitkasetsiri at yahoo.com;
h-pages: http://textbooksproject.com/HOME.html,
http://www.tu.ac.th/org/arts/seas;
662-424-5768, fax. 662-433-8713
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