<div>Thank you.</div> <div> </div> <DIV>Dont forget to visit Siam PetitionOnLine and sign it, if you please.</DIV> <DIV> </DIV> <DIV><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 16pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Angsana New'"><A href="http://www.petitiononline.com/SIAM2008/petition.html" target=_blank><SPAN style="COLOR: windowtext; TEXT-DECORATION: none; text-underline: none">http://www.petitiononline.com/SIAM2008/petition.html</SPAN></A>,<BR><A href="http://www.petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?siam2007&1" target=_blank><SPAN style="COLOR: windowtext; TEXT-DECORATION: none; text-underline: none">http://www.petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?siam2007&1</SPAN></A></SPAN></DIV> <DIV><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 16pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Angsana New'">Charnvit</SPAN></DIV> <div><BR><BR><B><I>justinm@ucr.edu</I></B> wrote:</div> <BLOCKQUOTE class=replbq style="PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #1010ff 2px solid">FYI. See attached.<BR>Best,<BR>jm<BR>From: Albert Valentine
<sophillyboy@hotmail.com><BR>Subject: Thailand-Military: Building Three New Bases in Southern Thailand<BR>Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2008 02:42:22 +0000<BR><BR> <STYLE> .hmmessage P { margin:0px; padding:0px } body.hmmessage { FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma } </STYLE> <STYLE>.hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px}body.hmmessage{FONT-SIZE: 10pt;FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma}</STYLE> I had no idea the Thais were considering this. I've been busy, so I haven't really been reading the local fish wraps, but I don't think this has hit the local papers yet. Once it does, I don't see how this is going to 'stabilize' the region [curious how the general population feels and of course the southern population]. I personally think this is going to create more problems on MANY levels. As we know, this is only going to antagonize the southern insurgents and the southern Thai-Malay-Muslims, the same population that does not trust the central Thai-Buddhists.
Think that building three (3) additional military bases in southern Thailand is going to make them warm up any time soon?<BR><BR>R/<BR>Al <BR><BR>Source: STRATFOR.<FONT style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma"></FONT><BR> <BLOCKQUOTE> <DIV class=EC_gmail_quote>---------- Forwarded message ----------<BR><BR>Not sure if you guys have seen this?<BR><BR><BR><BR>Thailand: Hope for Security in the South<BR>April 1, 2008 | 2202 GMT<BR><BR><BR>Thai soldiers patrol while checking security at a Buddhist temple in Pattani province<BR><BR><BR>Summary<BR>The Thai military has announced a plan to open <U><B>three new military bases and training camps in the<BR>southern provinces with a strategy to stabilize the region by 2009</B></U>. That this plan is being<BR>considered seriously suggests that reconciliation between the military and former Thai Prime<BR>Minister Thaksin Shinawatra�s supporters is under way. Increased military and police cooperation in<BR>the south will mean a
short-term increase in violence but eventual stability.<BR><BR>Analysis<BR>As part of a strategy to stabilize Thailand�s southern provinces, Thai army chief Gen. Anupong<BR>Paochinda announced March 27 that the military is renewing plans to construct three new bases of<BR>operation in the troubled region. This step is part of a greater plan to restore peace in the<BR>restive south by 2009. The military�s announcement comes just three months after a return to<BR>civilian government rule, which suggests a level of cooperation between the military and the<BR>government that signifies an end to their feuding of the last several years. An end to feuding in<BR>Bangkok means that progress might finally be possible in the troubled south.<BR><BR><BR><BR>In 2004, then-Prime Minister Thaksin � a former police officer � sent police to Thailand�s southern<BR>provinces to replace the military. His reason was that the military had lost the people�s trust<BR>after attacking a
mosque and being responsible for the death of several Muslim suspects during<BR>Ramadan. Violence continued in the south after the police took over, and Thaksin�s decision to<BR>replace the military exacerbated the struggle between the military and the police. In addition to<BR>economic troubles, Thaksin�s decision to withdraw the military caused a rift between the civilian<BR>and military leaders, and his administration was eventually toppled in 2006.<BR><BR>After some hesitation, the military sent an additional 30,000 troops to the south, but with little<BR>effect. The new civilian government � which embodies the tacit return of Thaksin�s influence � and<BR>the military are seeking to stabilize Thailand�s international image and economy, which means that<BR>the violence in the south that has led to almost 3,000 deaths since 2004 must be addressed. If<BR>Thaksin is indeed increasing his influence behind the scenes in Bangkok, the fact that the military<BR>is
stepping up its control over the south is a sign that the former prime minister has come to an<BR>agreement with his military rivals. If the civilian government and the military can come to a<BR>political agreement in Bangkok, then the military and the police will be better able to cooperate in<BR>combating violence in the south � a must if the security situation in the area is to improve.<BR><BR>The violence in the south involves religious and ethnic tensions, but also corrupt police (which is<BR>why military involvement is key), drug smugglers and organized criminals connected to the military<BR>(which is why police involvement is key). If Anupong�s plan is to have any effect, he needs a broad<BR>coalition of political support � and if he is to do it by the end of 2009, he will need to use tough<BR>tactics. The Thai military has approved the use of some of its helicopters and planes, which will<BR>provide support to both its soldiers and police forces � a sign
that the two institutions are at<BR>least attempting to cooperate.<BR><BR>The placement of military bases in Thailand�s south ensures that troops will be able to respond to<BR>violence quickly and with determined force. And with relative political stability in Bangkok, the<BR>military can focus its energy on containing violence in the south with less fear of being stymied<BR>politically. If the military and police forces in the south can cooperate as their political patrons<BR>in Bangkok seem to be doing, they could well reduce the scale of violence in the south.<BR><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE>_______________________________________________<BR>Tlc mailing list<BR>Tlc@lists.ucr.edu<BR>http://lists.ucr.edu/mailman/listinfo/tlc<BR></BLOCKQUOTE><BR><BR><BR><DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Charnvit Kasetsiri, Ph.D. <BR><BR>Senior Adviser and Lecturer</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Southeast Asian Studies Program</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Thammasat
University</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Bangkok 10200, Siam (not Thailand)</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf></FONT> </DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Secretary <BR>Social Sciences and Humanities Textbook Foundation</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>413/38 Arun-Amarin Rd.,</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf>Bangkok 10700, Siam <BR>handphone 089-476-0505<BR>e-mail: <A href="mailto:charnvitkasetsiri@yahoo.com">charnvitkasetsiri@yahoo.com</A>;</FONT><FONT color=#0000bf> <BR>h-pages: <A href="http://textbooksproject.com/HOME.html">http://textbooksproject.com/HOME.html</A>, </FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT color=#0000bf><A href="http://www.tu.ac.th/org/arts/seas">http://www.tu.ac.th/org/arts/seas</A>;<BR>662-424-5768, fax. 662-433-8713<BR><BR></DIV></FONT>