

Parochial Altruism in Civil Society Leaders: Legacies of Contested Governance

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Abstract

What explains variation in civil society organization (CSO) leadership quality in post-conflict settings? International donors perceive CSO leaders as chief purveyors of democracy in local communities after war due to their control of substantial resources and relationships with political actors. I theorize that wartime uncertainty generated by contested governance motivates parochial altruism among CSO leaders by conditioning them to retain resources. Discrimination emerges because rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, inducing CSO leaders to discriminate against outgroups. To test this theory, I leverage geographic variation in rebel control in Côte d'Ivoire through lab-in-the-field games. I find that CSO leaders who lived under contested governance are less altruistic and more discriminatory than their counterparts under continuous government control. I provide suggestive evidence of the mechanism drawn from interviews and survey data. These findings complicate our expectations of post-conflict democratization by providing greater understanding of the impact of relying on war-traumatized CSO leaders.

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1 INTRODUCTION

What explains variation in the quality of civil society organization (CSO) leaders in post-conflict countries, and how do wartime experiences affect their behavior?¹ CSO leaders are heralded as the chief purveyors of democracy in local communities, including in post-conflict contexts. The presence of a robust civil society is expected to contribute to democratic consolidation through the promotion of democratic norms and values (Diamond, 1994; Putnam, Leonardi and Nonetti, 1993) and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict by connecting citizens to the government and its services. CSOs – and, importantly, their leaders – are thus understood as significant social actors due to their perceived capacity to develop social capital, including trust and reciprocity, among target populations and program participants. In post-conflict contexts, social capital is expected to decrease citizen use of violence, increase cooperation and appreciation of diversity, and reduce intergroup tensions (Belloni, 2008; Fanthorpe and Maconachie, 2010). International donors also consider CSOs to be more accountable and reliable than low-functioning state institutions, and better able to achieve the intended objectives of democratization (Boulding, 2014; Brass, 2016). CSOs are viewed as crucial to helping local communities strive towards social repair, peace, and democracy after the cessation of hostilities (de Zeeuw and Kumar, 2006; Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). Because of these assumed virtues, international donors have allocated approximately 25 billion USD to CSOs in African countries during and after civil war over the past two decades.²

Yet, these priors overlook a fundamental fact: CSO leaders themselves are shaped by their wartime experiences. I develop a theory that links CSO leader wartime experience to post-conflict behaviors. I begin with the premise that CSO leaders are fundamentally different from citizens for at least two reasons. First, they control substantial resources that can contribute to democracy promotion, humanitarian assistance efforts, and civic education initiatives while serving as the face of democracy in local communities. Second, CSO leaders are often embedded in political processes where weakened opposition groups may see them as key allies who confront or criticize the incumbent regime (Dietrich and Wright, 2015; Grodsky, 2012). During civil war, citizens and international donors view CSO leaders as first responders who navigate polarized contexts and threats of violence, and determine on the fly who can be trusted and coordinated with to provide services to the population (Belloni, 2008; Ottaway, 2003; Posner, 2004; Goodhand, 2006). Research in these contexts has examined how war affects civilians (Bauer et al., 2016) or combatants (Justino and Stojetz, 2018), but has yet to assess in depth how war affects local CSO leaders.

¹A CSO is a formally registered, private, not-for-profit organization with public welfare goals (Brass, 2016). This project's design was pre-registered before analysis of any data.

²Author's calculations based on official Overseas Development data, 2016.

I then focus on one phenomenon of civil war – contested governance. CSO leaders who lived under contested rebel control experienced more uncertainty during wartime than those who lived under continuous government control. I explain that the uncertainty provoked by rebel control induces parochial altruism – altruism directed towards one’s own social group at the expense of other groups (Choi and Bowles, 2007) – among CSO leaders, which is inconsistent with democratic expectations. Uncertainty during periods of rebel control leads CSO leaders to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance. Discrimination emerges because distrust fomented during rebel takeover exacerbates existing cleavages, and encourages CSO leaders to become more discriminatory towards outgroups. These effects, in turn, condition the long-term prospects for democratization that civil society is expected to foster in post-war settings.

To evaluate how contested governance affects local CSO leaders over the long term, I employ a multi-method research design that leverages geographic variation in rebel control during Côte d’Ivoire’s decade-long civil war. I use a statistical matching case selection strategy to isolate the effect of contested rebel control on current day CSO leader behavior. After selecting most-similar geographic units for comparison, I created an original population frame of CSO leaders and invited 167 individuals from former rebel-controlled and former government-controlled regions to participate in a series of lab-in-the-field games to evaluate whether differences in behavior could be attributed to their historical exposure to contested rebel control.

I find that CSO leaders who lived under contested rebel control are less altruistic and more discriminatory than their counterparts who lived in areas under continuous government control. When allocating real funds in dictator games, leaders from former rebel-controlled areas kept 11 percentage points more for themselves, were more likely to discriminate against outgroups, and gave 7 percentage points less to village associations whose members are from different ethnic or political communities compared to CSO leaders who lived under continuous government control. I triangulate from interviews, survey data, and secondary data to offer suggestive evidence of the mechanisms underpinning my theoretical framework: CSO leaders who lived under rebel control experienced more uncertainty over public goods provision and fears of discrimination and victimization during the war than those who lived under government control.

I further bolster these findings by ruling out two alternative explanations of why CSO leaders who lived under rebel control exhibit less altruistic and more discriminatory behaviors. First, I demonstrate that CSO leaders who lived under rebel control were not more likely to benefit from the new regime or influxes of aid during the war than those who were in areas under government control. Second, I rule out the potential explanation that organizational or individual demographic characteristics better explain the findings.

This study makes four contributions. First, it strengthens theories regarding the micro-foundations of post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding (Hartman and Morse, 2018; Voors et al., 2012). I demonstrate that closely examining local attitudes and behaviors reveals how the polarization, distrust, and social rupture created by civil war inhibit democratization and peacebuilding. I provide micro-level evidence of how wartime traumas may cause CSO leaders to engage in non-democratic behavior — a finding that complicates our understanding of how war influences political behavior (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014; Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt, 2013; Blattman, 2009).

Second, while studies of democratization regularly examine elected officials, bureaucrats, chiefs, and religious leaders, they rarely consider the role of CSO leaders. Yet, these leaders are often the only elites citizens interact with: they provide crucial services and information in communities. In most cases, CSO leaders are more educated, older, and more likely to be better connected than the populations they serve (Banks, Hulme and Edwards, 2015; Barkan, 2012; Fafchamps and Owens, 2009; Howell and Pearce, 2002; Mercer, 2002). Furthermore, their work brings them into direct contact with international donors and government officials (Boulding, 2014; Carothers, 2011; Ottaway, 2003). Exploring CSO leaders' attitudes and behaviors thus addresses a significant lacuna in the literature, which has significant consequences for understanding countries' post-conflict trajectories. In this respect, I provide new insights to explain why donors and scholars cannot expect homogeneous political behavior by CSO leaders even when they are ostensibly committed to democracy and social cohesion.

Third, I advance an emerging strand of literature which argues that the institutional environment in which organizations emerge shape their ability to contribute to democracy. Organizations are often embedded in the political process and perpetuate the local political context (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996; Jamal, 2009; Posner, 2004) which may involve reinforcing existing political regimes instead of striving towards democracy. I show here that being subjected to contested rebel control can shape CSOs' ability to contribute to post-war democracy.

Finally, my findings highlight the need for policymakers to reconsider the assumptions underlying civil society-led strategies for democratization in post-conflict countries. Conventional wisdom emphasizes CSOs' positive role in fomenting pro-social attitudes and holding regimes accountable. This project nuances this expectation: the prospects for robust democracy are likely to be limited when CSO leaders fail to exhibit the altruism and inclusivity that liberal and representative governance often requires.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I argue that contested governance and uncertainty structure CSO leaders' behavior. I focus on contexts where rebel control is *contested*. Contestation may stem from violent or nonviolent confrontations between the rebels and the national military, between rebels and citizens, and/or within rebel groups (Weinstein, 2006; Kalyvas, 2006). While rebel takeover can sometimes produce stable governance structures (Arjona, 2016; Huang, 2016), civilians may have more trouble identifying who is in charge in contested areas compared to locations under firm rebel control. Contested rebel takeover disrupts the institutional environment, resulting in new institutions or fractured authority long after the initial takeover; challenges to authority from within ranks or from other entities can occur across time and space during rebel rule.

I argue that contested rebel control generates greater *uncertainty* in CSO leaders' everyday lives than their counterparts experienced living in areas under sustained government control.³ There are three observable and intertwined implications of the uncertainty generated by contested rebel control: unclear variation in access to public goods, fear of (and actual) victimization, and concerns about who to trust. CSO leaders living in areas under government control may feel some uncertainty, but they do not have to contend with rival regimes or the dissolution of existing structures that rebel takeover can induce (Mampilly, 2011).

Living under persistent exposure to fear, uncertainty, and stress can cultivate anti-social attitudes and behaviors (Vinck et al., 2007). Importantly, these attitudes and behaviors are not limited to victims of violence; war is a transformative social condition that involves changes in institutions, social relations, and the social order, even for those who did not directly experience violence (Lubkemann, 2010). While some research has shown that exposure to violence can induce altruism and social cohesion (Bellows and Miguel, 2009) or increase political participation (Blattman, 2009), other work has demonstrated that violence increases *intragroup* trust at the expense of *intergroup* trust (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013). These studies fail to probe whether violence interacts with other changes during civil war (e.g., in the institutional environment), and how this may affect post-war behavior. My theory suggests that the context in which violence is experienced affects pro-social attitudes after the war is over, which advances our understanding of the impact of civil war beyond wartime exposure to violence.

³This is not to diminish the fact that government forces, just like rebels, can also be predatory, extractive, and provide varying levels of public goods. In some contexts, rebel movements may be more legitimate and supported by local populations than the central state.

I posit that living in a context of uncertainty created by contested rebel control induces parochial altruism – increased ingroup allegiance and hardened hostilities towards outgroups – among CSO leaders. I describe how uncertainty regarding whether (and how) to access public goods, and over who CSO leaders can cooperate with under rebel control, reduces such leaders' levels of altruism and makes them more likely to discriminate against outgroups.

Because rebels are not guaranteed to provide public goods across time and space (Arjona, 2016; Kasfir, 2005), CSO leaders may face uncertainty about what types of public goods are available to them and whether their mandate requires them to provide complementary goods. If rebels provide public goods, this gives civilians a certain level of predictability in their social lives; if not, it induces disorder (Förster, 2015). CSO leaders may be unable to predict who is providing security or rule of law on a daily basis and may not know whether affiliation with certain actors influences access to public goods.

I argue that because contested rebel control produces uncertainty about how (or when) local CSO leaders will access public goods, this fundamentally changes how CSO leaders decide to redistribute resources: it motivates them to keep resources for themselves as a form of insurance. It also leads them to discount the long-term benefits of investing in and contributing to the development of others (Posner, 2004). A similar effect has been demonstrated in household economic behavior, where insecurity around public goods provision makes households less likely to invest in agriculture or long-term household expenses (Arias, Ibáñez and Zambrano, 2014).

Hypothesis 1. CSO leaders who lived under rebel control during wartime *redistribute fewer resources* in the post-war period than those who remained in government-controlled areas.

I further argue that victimization and discrimination exacerbate uncertainty for CSO leaders who were subjected to wartime rebel control. Since rebels may be more likely to resort to violence against civilians in contexts of uncertainty (Arjona, 2016), those under rebel control may feel insecure about whether they or their family will fall victim to violence perpetrated by these actors. Particularly in contexts where violence is meted out indiscriminately (Kalyvas, 2006), CSO leaders will be unable to predict who is likely to be targeted.

When the costs of determining who can be trusted are prohibitively high, CSO leaders hone their ability to make quick assessments of people and situations, using cues to evaluate who is likely to be honest and trustworthy. The easiest and most readily identifiable cues are ascriptive, but partisanship may also be distinguishable, especially where it is tied to ethnicity. When CSO leaders opt to help others, it is in their short-term best interest to practice parochial altruism and help those who are

most like them to avoid accidentally empowering enemies, given the difficulty of establishing who can be trusted.

I argue that CSO leaders discriminate based on identity as a shortcut to determine who can be trusted. Contestation over power can signal the negative qualities of opposing groups (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013), such as dishonesty and untrustworthiness. If a CSO leader provides goods and services to the population at large, she risks assisting individuals or communities aligned with the enemy, who could use these resources to threaten the organization's existence in the future.

Hypothesis 2. CSO leaders who lived under rebel control during wartime are *more likely to discriminate against outgroups* than those who remained in government-controlled areas.

I expect these effects of contested rebel control to endure after the war in two ways. First, the defining characteristics of the war – polarization, uncertainty, weak state capacity, and violence – do not immediately disappear after a peace agreement is signed. Indeed, it is difficult to even assess when a country is truly at permanent peace, since the likelihood of conflict recurrence remains high, particularly if grievances remain unaddressed and if political reform is slow (Gates, Nygård and Trappeniers, 2016). Since the underlying causes of war likely persist into the post-war period, CSO leaders should be expected to adapt the strategies they relied on during the war after the conflict ends.

Second, I argue that once an institutional culture of parochial altruism has been established within an organization's leadership, these behaviors persist through institutional learning. These leaders find that the strategies they employed during the war are effective: they helped them access certain communities, obtain aid, and foster relationships with those in charge. Therefore they continue to implement these strategies, other organizations replicate what organizations that came before them have done, and new leaders create organizations with a similar culture to that which was developed during the war.

To summarize, I posit that CSO leaders who lived under contested rebel control during the civil war were more likely to experience higher uncertainty than those who lived in areas that were continuously under government control. I therefore expect the former to be more likely to exhibit attitudes contrary to pro-social behavior than the latter.

3 CIVIL WAR IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

This study took place in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire, which experienced civil war from 2002 to 2011. War began when troops mutinied and launched simultaneous attacks in September 2002. The rebellion was motivated by discontent with the central government's discrimination against northerners (Dembele, 2003; McGovern, 2011). The rebels' primary goal was to overthrow the president, but they also sought to redress political grievances by demanding that the government hold inclusive elections with representation from the north, revise the citizenship and land ownership rights guaranteed in the constitution, and grant citizenship to all inhabitants (Kessé, 2005). By the end of September, rebel forces known as *the Forces Nouvelles* (FN) controlled the north of the country, and were based in Bouaké (see Figure 1). In October, the United Nations (UN) and French military created a 12,000 km² (7,500 sq. mi.) *zone de confiance* (ZDC) patrolled by UN forces to decrease confrontation between rebel forces and government troops.

The rebels were largely drawn from the Senoufo ethnic community in the north, and the initial leaders of the rebellion were part of this community. The rebels shared ethnicity and religion with the majority of the populations in the far north, which facilitated their entry into those communities (Förster, 2010). However, in other rebel-controlled areas the rebels were not co-ethnics with the local populations, especially in the west and central regions. Characterized as an authoritarian military administration (Heitz, 2009), Rebel leaders established radio stations, taxed local businesses, levied tolls on major transportation routes, and ran local police stations to settle civilian disputes (Speight, 2013).

During the civil war and in the post-war period, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a marked increase in the number of registered local organizations from 2,000 in the year 2000 to over 8,000 in 2016. This increase is primarily attributed to the influx of international aid, which made funding more widely available for such organizations. International funders treated these local CSOs as service providers that could deliver humanitarian aid (Floridi and Verdacchia, 2010). According to the Ministry of the Interior, 30% of nationally registered organizations state that their activities are designed to enhance social cohesion: their mission statements mention pro-social norms such as tolerance, community spirit, and unity. Such organizations are involved in an average of five sectors – particularly poverty alleviation (41%), development (32%), and local culture promotion (46%) (Davis, 2020b).

3.1 EVIDENCE OF CONTESTED REBEL CONTROL

The rebel-controlled areas around the ZDC were not firmly held during the course of the war: 20 battles ensued between rebels and government forces in these zones while the ZDC was in place, causing at least 30 deaths (ACLED 2019). Thus citizens living under rebel control were more likely to witness contestation between belligerents during the war.

Other armed groups also contested for control in this area. In 2005, a militia led by a pastor carried out several attacks against rebels and civilians in and around Man in the west of the country (Human Rights Watch, 2005). French forces suspected that the government financed and supported this militia to continue attacks in rebel-held territory despite the ceasefire (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2006). Indeed, the FN and government both supported militias during the ceasefire: unidentified armed groups also perpetrated attacks against UN and French troops in the north. Two new rebel groups emerged in the west comprised largely of former Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters. These mercenaries had a reputation of using violence indiscriminately against civilians. One interviewee stated that, when these mercenaries first arrived, their allegiance was not clear.⁴ However, it was soon evident that the FN supported both groups, and may have even encouraged their creation (Ero, Marshall and Marchal, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Heitz, 2009).

After the rebels consolidated their control over most of the occupied territories, they still faced internal conflict that affected local residents' everyday lives. In 2007, there were clashes between rogue followers of a former leader and the main FN leader (Leboeuf, 2017). A CSO leader in Man related how the main rebel leader had to send emissaries to investigate human rights abuses by the local commander,⁵ while Speight (2013) discusses how the FN leadership had to intervene when rebels were exploiting local populations in the east of the country.

CSO leaders shared that during the war, they were unclear about the power wielded by different groups. One leader affirmed that there were not just rebels from the north present in the west, but also unknown soldiers who would shout expletives in English. She asserted that whether they would be harassed by the rebels depended on who was in charge, which changed often. When the rebels first arrived, their commander was sympathetic to the plight of the local population. But subsequent commanders were not nearly as caring: one leader was so brutal and chaotic, he would roam the streets shooting bullets into the ground to instill fear in the population. Another commander had to

⁴ Author interviews, Man and Facobly, 2018

⁵ Author interview, Man, May 10, 2019

be violently removed by the rebel administration.⁶ These leadership changes occurred in a relatively short period of time and without the predictability of elections or some other means of understanding the cause of turnover; CSO leaders and their constituencies were uncertain who would be in power from one day to the next.

3.2 EVIDENCE OF UNCERTAINTY UNDER CONTESTED REBEL CONTROL

I next provide evidence from Côte d'Ivoire that illustrates the mechanism, uncertainty, by showing that citizens living in areas under contested rebel control experienced a lower provision of public goods and discrimination by rebels – aspects of wartime uncertainty that have affected their subsequent behavior.

The FN's provision of public goods varied over time and by location. It failed to provide most citizens in western Côte d'Ivoire with basic infrastructure, healthcare, and education (Martin, 2020). CSO leaders were unable to predict who was providing security or rule of law on a daily basis in rebel-controlled areas, and did not know whether access to public goods was determined by affiliation with certain actors. A CSO leader working in the west described the rebels' reign as a monopoly that ruled with *carte blanche*: while the rebels established a justice system, people did not bring issues to them for fear of how they would "regulate" the problems. He described the rebels' rule as brutal, citing bodies in the street, and disorderly.⁷

Interviews with Ivorian CSO leaders in former rebel-controlled zones confirm that these leaders faced more uncertainty regarding who administered governance. One interviewee who had worked in both government- and rebel-controlled areas during the war asserted that people were tolerant of government forces, as they were well trained. However, on the rebel side, "there was no way to know who was in authority, but they all had guns."⁸ Individuals interviewed for this study indicated that citizens living in rebel-held areas faced constant shakedowns. Those from rebel-controlled zones frequently used terms like "disorder" and "brutal" to describe how the rebels governed. In western Côte d'Ivoire, CSO leaders described life under rebel control as "living in the bush for 3 years" without access to education or healthcare.⁹ Even in places that experienced very little violence, civilians still fled out of fear; CSO leaders explained that "the population did not die necessarily from violence but due to anxiety around the war."¹⁰

⁶Interviews in Man, 2017-2018

⁷Author interview, Man, April 13, 2018

⁸Author interview, Duékoué, 19 April 2018.

⁹Author interview, Facobly, April 12, 2018

¹⁰Author interview, Kouibly, April 12, 2018

While discrimination and victimization did occur in areas under continuous government control, the FN was more likely to face opposition and incomplete information about loyalty and notoriously used indiscriminate violence. Citizens living under rebel control experienced violence from both government and rebel forces, while citizens living under government control did not face the threat of rebel violence (ACLED 2019). The population under rebel control could not easily discern who could be trusted based on institutional affiliations, as the lines between rebels, local government, and military were blurred. Instead, “trust in personal identities became much stronger than before” (Förster, 2010, 209). Although the rebels cooperated with some ethnic groups, others were repeatedly discriminated against (Speight, 2013; Van Baalen, 2020). CSO leaders said that living under rebel control meant they faced an “incessant threat”: no one knew who to trust.¹¹ One social cohesion organization leader stated that the population felt “betrayed” by the rebels, because they had promised to protect the local population, but instead abused them.¹² Reprisals in the north and west, particularly against ethnic groups perceived to support the government, were swift and frequent.

Faced with distrust and uncertainty over how the rebels would ultimately impact their work, CSO leaders adopted new strategies to cope with their changed environment. When asked to describe their peers’ present-day attitudes and behaviors, CSO leaders lamented that they believed other leaders lacked altruism and were only out to get money – and that this disposition developed during the war.¹³ CSO leaders were said to still be stuck in a “humanitarian” mentality, which revolved around short-term projects, rather than a “development” mentality focused on long-term sustainability. These leaders had grown accustomed to handouts during the war, and had not adjusted to the peace period, several CSO leaders voiced.¹⁴

CSO leaders asserted that their peers from rebel-controlled territories were more likely to discriminate in their work. A youth organization leader complained that there were leaders in his community that “only help out their own ethnic groups and forget about others.” He described attending another organization’s training seminar where he should have received a per diem but did not, which he believes was due to his ethnicity.¹⁵ The office director of a national development organization, who was from an ethnic group from the south, felt that he had no friends among his peers due to his ethnicity.¹⁶

¹¹ Author interview, November 27, 2017

¹² Author interview, November 27, 2017

¹³ Author interviews with CSO leaders in Man, November 8-12, 2017.

¹⁴ Author interview, Man, May 8-12, 2018

¹⁵ Author interview with CSO leader in Man, November 11, 2017

¹⁶ Author interview, Man, November 12, 2017

When I asked one CSO leader why these attitudes and behaviors still seem to persist, he explained, “change is slow. Many organizations copied lots of things and they are slow to evolve.” CSO leaders interviewed for the study also reminded me that the contexts in which they currently lived were not altogether different from when the rebels were in control. One interviewee mentioned that weapons still circulated in the west and that the threat of violence still looms as many no longer have anything to lose by using violence, because their families were killed.¹⁷ A women’s organization leader frustratingly reported that each time she went to the market she had to greet the men who had arrested her during the war, some of whom now hold powerful positions in government. The populations that these organizations serve remain vulnerable and distrustful. A leader of an agricultural cooperative lamented that farmers did not want to pay their dues arguing, “why pay when the war might return?” Ex-combatants have returned to their villages, and some populations do not want to interact with the people they accuse of killing or causing the death of their family members. “Where is good governance?” one leader sarcastically asked, professing that it takes time for the state to properly function after war. A leader working for a Catholic organization used an apt analogy: he explained that peace is a ladder; it is not achieved all at once, but instead requires many steps before it is successful.¹⁸

Taken together, this case data offers suggestive evidence to illustrate how contested rebel takeover created uncertainty for CSO leaders. By navigating the polarized context during and after the war, they developed parochial altruism that continues today.

The war culminated with presidential elections in 2010: violence renewed after both candidates claimed victory. The standoff ultimately ended when French troops intervened to remove the sitting president from power in April 2011. Since then, the country has stabilized and experienced economic growth, but concerns abound regarding whether reconciliation and sustained peace have been achieved. Allegations of victor’s justice remain strong (Piccolino, 2016), inter-ethnic violence continues to flare up across the country, and political alliances are fragile.

Although the empirical data for this analysis are drawn from Côte d’Ivoire, the findings and the theory developed apply more broadly to other country contexts that have similar post-conflict dynamics. First, Côte d’Ivoire represents a case typical of other recent civil wars: a center-seeking conflict in which rebels held territory and their preferred political party won power after the end of hostilities (Huang, 2016; Dresden, 2017). Second, countries emerging from civil war are known to have weak CSOs. The public is more likely to view CSOs negatively, CSOs tend to be less effective at advocacy efforts, and tend to have lower organizational capacity than organizations in countries

¹⁷ Author interview, Man, April 13, 2018

¹⁸ Author interviews in Western Côte d’Ivoire, April-May 2018

without a recent history of civil war (USAID, 2016). CSOs in countries like Liberia and South Sudan acknowledge that both the public and government view them as politicized and treat them with hostility, while organizational leaders in Mozambique are seen as using international aid to help themselves rather than their constituents (USAID, 2016). The findings of this project and the theory developed can be generalized to other country contexts that have similar post-conflict dynamics.

4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY


One of the difficulties associated with studying how being subject to rebel control in the past affects CSO leaders' current behavior is that any research design must account for potential confounders. In Côte d'Ivoire, the zones that rebels occupied were poorer, anti-incumbent, and home to geographically concentrated ethnic communities (Appendix Table A1 reports pre-matching covariates). To overcome the vast differences in the contextual environments that CSO leaders faced in rebel- vs. government-controlled areas during the war, I employ statistical matching (Nielsen, 2016) to find “most similar” departments selecting on pre-treatment variables associated with rebel control (Appendix Table A2 presents the cases and their Mahalanobis distances). The “treatment” here is whether the rebels entered and controlled a territory in 2002.

Table 1: Balance test of matched pairs

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value	N
Distance to Abidjan, km	392.97	325.53	67.44	0.02	21
Anti-Incumbent, 2001	0.47	0.54	-0.07	0.44	21
Night Lights, 2000	0.35	0.33	0.02	0.90	21
Child Mortality, 2000	28.03	24.89	3.14	0.46	21
Northern Ethnic Groups, 1998	0.32	0.25	0.07	0.49	21
<i>Other Pre-war variables</i>					
Akan, 1998	0.24	0.36	-0.12	0.15	21
Krou, 1998	0.13	0.24	-0.11	0.08	21
South Mandé, 1998	0.30	0.14	0.17	0.13	21
Muslim, 1998	0.40	0.36	0.03	0.50	21
1998 Population	523516.12	574791.54	-51275.41	0.72	21
Land inequality, gini coefficient	0.58	0.73	-0.15	0.12	21
Health centers per 1000 inhabitants, 2001	1.13	1.22	-0.09	0.69	21
Average 10-year rainfall (1992-2002), in	104.56	113.89	-9.33	0.41	21
Cacao production, kg	15469.50	58663.62	-43194.12	0.01	21
Distance to lootable gold, km	226024.58	192282.12	33742.47	0.31	21
Pre-war battles at least one in dept, 1992-2001	0.12	0.23	-0.11	0.55	21
Distance to Liberian border	223.58	151.06	72.52	0.20	21

To create the sample of matched departments, I conditioned on five pre-treatment covariates: distance to Abidjan (the economic capital), vote share against the incumbent president's party in 2001 municipal elections, share of population from northern ethnic groups (North Mandé and Voltaïque), average night lights density, and average child mortality rates (see Table 1). These variables are proxies for the expressed grievances of perceived discrimination against northerners (Dembele, 2003; Mcgovern, 2011). This yields a matched sample of 21 departments: eight former rebel-controlled and 13 former government-controlled (See Figure 1). The sample of departments is also balanced on war and post-war covariates (see Appendix Table A3). Table 1 establishes that the matched cases are similar across the conditioning variables, as well as other pre-treatment variables, including population, additional ethnic and religious communities, geographic characteristics, and pre-war violence.¹⁹

Figure 1: Selected cases in Côte d'Ivoire



Note: Gray indicates rebel-controlled territories (2002-2011), and white depicts government-controlled. Black outlines the selected cases. Boxed cities are lab locations. Yamoussoukro and Abidjan are the political and economic capitals, respectively. Black dotted lines represent the *zone de confiance* (ZDC).

¹⁹There is imbalance on distance to Abidjan, due to the geographic nature of the rebel control. Results hold when examining just those departments close to the ZDC (thus correcting for this imbalance). A similar concern can be made about imbalance on cacao production, as cacao production is primarily limited to the southern and western departments. However, if we drop the non-cacao producing rebel-controlled departments from the sample, the results still hold: See Appendix C.1.

The map demonstrates that most of the departments in the sample are clustered around the ZDC, which helps alleviate concerns about the disparate conditions of the far-north. However, several matched departments are in the far southwest. This distribution is a product of migration policy during the 1960s and 1970s: since the economy was based primarily on cocoa and coffee exports, the founding president encouraged migration from the north to the plantations in the south by proclaiming that whoever toiled the land, owned it (Bah, 2010). The primary migrants were from northern Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea, and identified with northern ethnic communities (Akindès, 2004; Chauveau and Bobo, 2003; Colin, Kouamé and Soro, 2007). This explains why certain southern departments are matches for departments with similar ethnic make-ups farther north.

This statistical matching strategy is buttressed by the plausibility that government-controlled areas in the sample could have fallen under rebel control. In 2002, rebels were headed south, but government forces and local militias held them back. The UN and French forces established the ZDC to limit violence between the state and rebel forces. The ZDC's location is not random, but its existence boosts the potential of this matching and counterfactual design: rebels and government forces would have continued advancing had the ZDC not been drawn. My interviews confirmed that prior to the creation of the ZDC, rebels were attempting to capture and advance south through cities that later became part of the zone. My analyses include the full sample of matched cases, although the results hold if I omit the departments farther from the ZDC (see Appendix Table A13).

5 LAB-IN-THE-FIELD DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

To examine CSO leader behavior, I built a sample population of CSO leaders in these 21 departments using organizational lists from national networks, local networks, and international donors (Appendix Section B describes the sampling method). Local survey enumerators contacted CSO leaders by phone and told them if they completed an initial 1-hour survey, they would be invited to a workshop held by an academic researcher. Respondents were not told of the nature of the workshop – that it involved the possibility of winning money – until after they completed the survey (N=243). More than two-thirds (68%) of the initial survey participants attended the workshop (N=167). Appendix Sections F and G provide additional details on informed consent, Institutional Review Board approval, and study preregistration.

The lab activities were embedded in a capacity-building workshop,²⁰ in which I and a team of research assistants presented sessions on volunteer culture and fund-raising activities to CSO

²⁰See Figure A1 in the Appendix for lab locations. Materials available upon request.

leaders. The workshop had two goals. The first was to introduce realism to the lab, as CSO leaders often attend workshops organized by international donors. Second, in interviews, the leaders asked how my research would help them; they requested that I provide them with information about the nonprofit sector in the United States to improve their own fundraising prospects. This was thus a way to give back to the participants in the study (Davis, 2020a). The lab and workshop lasted for a maximum of 4 hours. Participants were reimbursed for their transportation costs and lunch. The lab began by administering a survey, followed by two presentations, and then participants completed the games.

Since the workshop likely primed leaders to be more altruistic or cooperative, due to the content of the presentations on fundraising and volunteerism, this would have made it even more difficult to demonstrate any difference in the level of parochial altruism among respondents. Priming the leaders in such a way prior to completion of the dictator games makes this a harder test of my theory.

To measure altruism and discrimination – key components of parochial altruism – I adapted a series of dictator games to the local context. These games are popular in economics, political science, and psychology as a behavioral measure of social preferences such as generosity, altruism, and a sense of fairness (Voors et al., 2012; McCauley, 2014). Researchers use them to overcome issues of endogeneity in observational assessments of behavior.

In this study's dictator game, each respondent was presented with two village associations with varying characteristics designed to investigate salient types of ingroups and outgroups in Côte d'Ivoire: different or same department (indicates to the respondent that the recipient is a neighbor); different or same ethnic group (indicates whether they are a co-ethnic); and different or same political identity (shows whether they are a co-partisan). I did not include religion as a variable in the experiment; although religion is important in Côte d'Ivoire, it is not seen as a cause of the conflict (McCauley, 2017). The games were designed to measure each participant's degree of altruism and how willing they are to discriminate. Figure 2 illustrates examples of how respondents perceived the games (translated from French to English).

The respondents completed nine games; they allocated 3,000 FCFA in each round. In the first round, they chose to allocate 1,000 FCFA (\$1.67) in 100 FCFA coins either to themselves or to two village associations with each of the characteristics above. In round 2, the three games were replayed, but participants could only keep 500 FCFA for themselves; they had to allocate the rest to the two associations to prevent them from always keeping all the money for themselves. In round 3, they were told they have two 500 FCFA coins, and that no individual (including themselves) can get

both coins. They must therefore discriminate when selecting who they allocate the money to, including against themselves.

This resulted in total possible take-home winnings of 6,000 FCFA (10 USD, or twice the official daily minimum wage) and a total of 7,500 FCFA that could be distributed to the associations. All the games were played at the end of the session. Respondents played alone on a tablet and had no interactions with the recipients of the funds they were allocating; the recipients were unknown to the respondent.

At the end of the session, the respondents collected their winnings from me confidentially, either in person or via mobile money. Before playing the games, participants were instructed that the money they allocated would be provided to a randomly selected recipient association from the 21 departments (including their own organization) after all of the workshops were completed. Once the study finished, I randomly selected associations from the first survey to receive the sums that were allocated in the games, based on their characteristics.

Figure 2: Examples of dictator games

The figure displays three examples of dictator game interfaces. Each interface shows 100 FCFA coins at the top. The first two interfaces (left and middle) show allocation options for 'Yourself', 'An association whose members share your political opinions', 'An association whose members are the same ethnic group as you', and 'An association whose members do not share your political opinions'. The third interface (right) shows allocation options for 'Yourself', 'An association from your department', and 'An association from a different department'. All interfaces have a 'Total' field at the bottom.

Note: From left to right: example of copartisan dictator game in round 1; example of coethnic dictator game in round 2; example of same department dictator game in round 3.

6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The independent variable of interest in the empirical analysis is whether the CSO leader currently lives in a former rebel-controlled department in the matched sample. As noted in Table 2, a majority of the participants in the lab-in-the-field did not move during the war, while subsequent analyses demonstrate that results are robust when controlling for migration (see the Appendix for balance on these variables).

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample covariates. Most participants were male, had completed some high school, and were aged between 35 and 44. In the lab-in-the-field sample, northerners (North Mandé and Voltaïque) are well represented, as they make up 21% of the general population. Muslims are underrepresented in the sample, as roughly 40% of the national population is this faith. Most leaders were founders of their organization, and close to 40% were employed in the civil society sector prior to working for their current organization, the majority of which were founded prior to or during the war. As noted in Appendix Tables A6 and A7, organizations from which these leaders are drawn are more similar than not on a number of dimensions: organizations from the former-rebel controlled departments have similar numbers of members, are just as likely to work in rural areas, and are just as likely to be created before or during the war than organizations from former-government controlled departments. Where there is imbalance in organizational characteristics, I control for these variables in subsequent analyses.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for lab-in-the-field sample

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Std.dev	N
CSO leader from rebel depts	0.41	0	1	0.49	167
Female	0.22	0	1	0.41	165
Age above 35	0.69	0	1	0.46	166
Some secondary education	0.67	0	1	0.47	157
Muslim	0.18	0	1	0.38	158
Northern ethnic group (North Mandé or Voltaïque)	0.27	0	1	0.44	162
Party ID is president's party	0.46	0	1	0.50	138
Income covers expenses	0.51	0	1	0.50	156
Did not migrate during war	0.73	0	1	0.44	161
Migrated during war	0.11	0	1	0.31	156
<i>Organization-level covariates</i>					
Founder	0.68	0	1	0.47	152
Worked in CSOs prior	0.38	0	1	0.49	155
Created before war	0.17	0	1	0.38	156
Created during war	0.40	0	1	0.49	156
Internationally funded	0.45	0	1	0.50	156
Natl headquarters	0.17	0	1	0.38	155
Total number of domains	6.58	0	23	5.02	156
Humanitarian	0.47	0	1	0.50	156
Info provision	0.86	0	1	0.35	156

To measure the level of altruism of the sample population, I calculate the share of the amount that leaders allocated to themselves (6000 FCFA). Table 3 presents the raw sums. To measure discrimination, I total the amount the respondent allocated to the outgroup as a share of the total amount that could be allocated to others (7500 FCFA).²¹ I code “outgroup” as associations comprised of non-coethnics, non-copartisans, and members of a different department. Results are analyzed employing difference-in-means tests and regression analysis.

²¹This measure is not perfectly negatively correlated with the amount kept (the altruism measure), since respondents could choose between three options – keeping for themselves, giving to the outgroup, or giving to the in-group. Nevertheless, in Appendix Table A11 I utilize a more conservative measure: I total the amount the respondent allocated to the outgroup as a share of the total amount not kept (so the denominator is 9,000 FCFA minus the amount not kept for self). I show that the results are still relatively robust with this specification.


Table 3: Outcomes summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Std. Dev.	N
Self	3634.73	0	5900	1208.30	167
Coethnic	795.78	0	1800	391.63	166
Noncoethnic	952.73	100	1700	353.65	165
Copartisan	844.79	0	1900	361.78	163
Noncopartisan	809.26	0	1900	376.78	162
Outgroup	2443.21	100	4900	920.02	162

7 LAB-IN-THE-FIELD FINDINGS

The results presented here generally provide strong, consistent support for the theoretical expectations. Figure 3 presents the difference-in-means for the amount CSO leaders allocated to themselves and the amount they allocated to outgroups. These results indicate that living in former rebel-controlled territory substantially decreased altruism. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Panel A of Figure 3 shows that leaders from former rebel-held zones kept more for themselves than their counterparts in the former government-controlled zones. The estimated effects on the amount kept in the dictator game translate into a roughly 11 percentage point increase; those who lived in former rebel zones kept the equivalent of \$1.35 (or 2 hours' worth of pay at the minimum wage) more than those who lived in former government zones. In Round 3, which is the clearest measure of whether respondents will act altruistically by discriminating against themselves, only 8% of respondents from former rebel-controlled departments always discriminated against themselves, while 19% from former government-controlled departments did. Half of CSO leaders from former government-controlled departments discriminated against themselves at least once, compared to only 25% from former rebel-controlled departments (See Appendix Table A8 for these results).

Figure 3: Dictator games results



Note: The bars reflect the mean with 95% confidence intervals. Round points show the distribution of the amount allocated; darker points represent more respondents. The connecting bars are from two-tailed difference-in-means tests, with associated p-values.

There are two key findings related to discrimination. First, respondents from rebel-controlled territories were more likely to discriminate against outgroups at least once during game play compared to those from government-controlled areas (84% vs. 64%, See Appendix Figure A2). Panel B in Figure 3 shows the difference in means for the sums they allocated to non-copartisan, non-coethnic, and different department associations (“outgroup”) (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). CSO leaders in former rebel zones were significantly more likely to discriminate against associations who are from outgroups; the difference represents the equivalent of \$1, or over an hour’s worth of pay at the minimum wage.

Taken together, these findings corroborate the theory’s expectations regarding altruism and discrimination. Table 4 reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with a dummy variable for CSO leaders from rebel departments. Columns (2) and (6) present the results of regression analyses including controls for individual covariates – gender, education, northern ethnicity, and migration status. Columns (3) and (7) include controls for organizational level covariates – international funding, size of the organization, national headquarters, when the organization was created, humanitarian work, and whether their primary goal is information

provision (See Appendix Section B.2 for balance on these variables), while columns (4) and (8) include all controls. The results hold even after controlling for these covariates: CSO leaders from former rebel-controlled departments consistently keep more for themselves and allocate less to outgroups than their compatriots in former government-controlled departments.

Table 4: Egocentrism and discrimination among CSO leaders

	Percent allocated to self				Percent allocated to outgroups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Leader from rebel depts	0.109*** (0.034)	0.121*** (0.042)	0.098*** (0.029)	0.106** (0.041)	-0.078*** (0.019)	-0.073*** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.018)	-0.052** (0.024)
Observations	167	151	155	136	162	146	150	136
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Each column represents a separate OLS regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by department. Individual controls: gender, education, and northern ethnicity. Organizational controls: international funding, national headquarters, total domains, created after the war, created during the war, humanitarian work, and information provision. Smaller sample size for organization controls because I could not link 11 game subjects to the organizational survey due to survey error. Appendix contains the full models.

Additional robustness tests – excluding departments that are far from the ZDC, controlling for workshop session effects, and examining only individuals who were leaders before or during the war – confirm the relationship between contested rebel control and parochial altruism (see Appendix Section C).

Further, I examine whether intra-war or post-war political dynamics better predict the observed outcomes. First, I account for the fact that the rebel-supported candidate was in power at the time of the study, whose government was accused of *ethnic rattrapage*, prioritizing co-ethnics for jobs (Babo, 2019). I proxy for the victor's patronage using measures of CSO leader relationships with local government and government ministries. Contrary to expectations, CSO leaders who lived in government-controlled areas during the war are *more likely* to have relationships with government ministries (31% of the organizations) than those who lived under rebel control (16%).²² There is no difference in the number of ministries with which the organizations have partnerships. Nor is there is any difference in the number of organizations that have relationships with local government on either side of the ZDC. Though this is not a perfect test of the patronage argument, it does demonstrate that

²²There could be an argument that those leaders who partner with government ministries on the government side are less discriminatory because they are working across ethnic lines in partnering with the government. However, this is not the case: leaders with ties to the central government on the government side do not give more or less to the outgroup than those leaders who do not have such partnerships (See Appendix C.4.)

parochial altruism is unlikely to be explained by access to patronage or corruption in the new regime on the part of CSO leaders who lived under rebel control.

Second, I find no evidence that more aid was routed to former rebel-held areas, which better explains the outcomes I observe. Using two measures, AidData (2016) and an original analysis of proximity to international organization locations in 2006, I find that departments in the sample were more similar on these dimensions than different (see Appendix Table A3). I do not dispute that opportunists took advantage of the humanitarian crisis to better themselves at the expense of their supposed constituents; however, I find no evidence that this practice was limited to individuals who lived in rebel-controlled areas during the conflict.

I also consider whether CSO leaders who are less altruistic and discriminatory selected into leadership in former rebel-controlled departments. In Appendix Section D, I present the results of two analyses. I first perform propensity score matching using genetic matching to maximize covariate balance in the lab sample. Second, I examine the characteristics of the full population frame of CSO leaders in the 21 departments (N=826) to examine whether leaders and their organizations are systematically different on either side of the ZDC. I find no evidence in either analysis that egocentric or discriminatory leaders selected into leadership under rebel control. Instead, rebel control appears to have changed leaders' behaviors and attitudes, inducing them to be less altruistic and discriminatory.

Finally, because most of the CSO leaders from former rebel departments are neither northerners (66%) nor Muslims (79%, see Appendix Table A4), and therefore not co-ethnics nor co-religionists with the rebels, an alternative explanation could be that being a minority under rebel control makes individuals less altruistic and discriminatory. This could be a product of the matching strategy: the departments in the matched sample are more diverse than the rebel strongholds. If this alternative explanation were true, we would expect CSO leaders who lived under rebel control and who were not co-ethnics/co-religionists with the rebels to be less altruistic and more discriminatory than northerners or Muslims. However, this is not the case: among CSO leaders who lived under rebel control, groups not represented by the rebels were not more likely to exhibit parochial altruism than those of northern origin (see Appendix Section D.5).

8 MECHANISMS

In this section I provide further suggestive evidence of the uncertainty mechanism. First, I show that CSO leaders from former-rebel controlled departments experienced more uncertainty during the

war than those who lived continuously under government control. Second, I show that these leaders believe the uncertainty during the war explains why their peers engage in parochial altruism.

In the lab survey, I measured leaders' levels of wartime uncertainty using a battery of questions. The results presented in Table 5 demonstrate that CSO leaders from former rebel-held zones were more likely to express fear of the rebels and the government, live in danger, hide due to fear for their lives, and experience discrimination, than their counterparts who lived in government-controlled areas. Further, these leaders were more likely to agree with descriptions of the war period as uncertain and lacking rule of law.

Table 5: Individual experience with uncertainty

<i>During the war...</i>	Rebel	Govt	Difference	P-value	N	Min	Max
I felt in danger	5.21	3.94	1.26	0.00	0	6	151
I felt rule of law persisted	2.45	3.89	-1.44	0.00	0	6	138
I didn't know who ruled	3.47	2.46	1.01	0.01	0	6	133
I feared the rebels	5.16	4.36	0.80	0.00	0	6	144
I feared the govt	2.62	1.69	0.93	0.02	0	6	132
I faced discrimination (ethnic, religious, or partisanship)	0.61	0.40	0.21	0.02	0	1	141

Note: Table presents difference-in-means (two-tailed t-tests).

In addition to self-reports of their experiences during the war, CSO leaders also pointed to uncertainty and the challenges rebel control presented during the war. After the completion of the labs, I re-contacted the participants to disseminate the findings and to inquire whether they found the findings plausible. I also asked them to derive their own mechanisms for the findings. Although not all participants responded,²³ their responses provide evidence that CSO leaders themselves are reflecting on the role the war had on their behaviors. When I asked, “why do CSO leaders from former rebel zones keep more for themselves and discriminate?”, 71% agreed that “CSO leaders from the former rebel zones lived in more fear and uncertainty during the war than those from the government zones.” One respondent even stated “in a demonstration of solidarity, CSO leaders in the former-rebel zones first give to those like them, even if it does not necessarily mean they did not help others later.”

²³I provide a description of this data collection effort in the Appendix.

9 CONCLUSION

Using lab-in-the-field games, I measured the behaviors and attitudes of CSO leaders – an important group of decision-makers whose work directly affects democratization and development. I find that the experience of living under rebel control during wartime substantially influences CSO leader behavior in post-conflict settings. I show that CSO leaders from former rebel-held zones are more likely to engage in parochial altruism than those who lived in former government-held areas.

These findings have broader implications for post-conflict development and democratization. Altruism is lauded as being important to the success of the non-profit sector; CSO leaders who do not display this quality and who may discriminate in their distribution of goods may not be the best partners in working to develop social cohesion in low-development settings. Such leaders may reinforce cleavages, contribute to polarization, and hamper the inclusive distribution of resources in the post-war period.

The policy implication is not that international donors should stop working with CSO leaders. In fact, CSOs are sometimes the only providers of public goods, information, and resources to populations affected by civil war. The strategies they developed during the war reflect their survival skills and ability to navigate the difficulties brought on by the conflict to continue their work. However, these findings do show that a “one-size-fits-all” strategy for civil society development may not be prudent when working with local organizations in post-conflict settings. They highlight the need for donors to understand the sub-national dynamics that shape behaviors and attitudes when working with local actors and to overcome biases in order to productively contribute to post-conflict democracy and development.

By evaluating democratization at the CSO leader level of analysis, rather than that of organizations or institutions, I provide insight into the behaviors and attitudes of important decision-makers operating in post-conflict democratization contexts. This represents a compelling avenue of future research that could assess variation in attitudes and behaviors across regime types, degrees of development, and levels of democracy. Further, by considering CSO leaders as important players in the democratization process, this paper also suggests avenues of research that examine the wartime effects on other types of local leaders, such as religious leaders and traditional leaders.

This investigation of how CSO leaders are uniquely affected by contested rebel control enhances our broader understanding of how civil war affects civilians in general, and how it influences post-conflict democracy and development outcomes at various levels. However, the study suffers from at least three limitations. First, the research design helped me rule out confounding factors but

introduced limits on claims about the widespread effect of rebel control on CSO leader behavior. Second, this design only allows for comparisons within contested zones; it does not tell us about differences between rebel and government strongholds. Nor does it permit significant comparison within rebel- or government-held zones. Third, although prior work has widely used dictator games to measure pro-social behavior, this study provides only qualitative evidence to support claims that these findings reflect the real world. Further investigation and measures of pro-social attitudes and behavior would complement any project using these methods.

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A Case selection

A.1 Case selection: Pre-treatment balance

Table A1: Balance on matching covariates, pre-treatment

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N
Distance to Abidjan, km	483.45	218.19	265.27	0	120
Anti-Incumbent, 2001	0.63	0.48	0.15	0	120
Night Lights, 2000	0.33	0.87	-0.53	0	120
Child Mortality, 2000	40.76	26.05	14.71	0	120
Northern Ethnic Groups, 1998	0.66	0.23	0.43	0	120

A.2 Matched cases

Table A2: Cases using Mahalanobis distance matching

Pair	Dept	Rebel	Dist. Abidjan	Night Light 2000	Child Mort. 2000	Northern 1998	Anti- Incumbent 2001	d
1	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	0.29
	Zoukougbeu	0	357.59	0.16	33.20	0.27	0.45	
2	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	0.39
	Tai	0	380.02	0.03	31.41	0.18	0.69	
3	Man	1	459.89	0.84	35.84	0.12	0.28	0.57
	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	
4	Facobly	1	427.87	0.60	30.11	0.12	0.24	0.77
	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	
5	Niakaramandougou	1	410.41	0.24	18.68	0.43	0.63	0.81
	Tabou	0	367.95	0.07	13.50	0.19	0.52	
6	Duekoue	0	391.62	0.22	34.82	0.18	0.43	0.88
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
7	Botro	1	318.69	0.45	12.58	0.43	0.56	0.92
	Sinfra	0	241.97	0.68	11.35	0.19	0.49	
8	Mankono	1	385.62	0.17	40.61	0.86	0.78	0.97
	Nassian	0	348.07	0.11	30.16	0.71	0.73	
9	Botro	1	318.69	0.45	12.58	0.43	0.56	1.02
	Oume	0	201.94	0.48	10.53	0.23	0.44	
10	Kouibly	1	418.36	0.18	28.93	0.12	0.22	1.05
	Toulepleu	0	500.59	0.24	36.39	0.18	0.36	
11	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	1.07
	San Pedro	0	311.27	0.47	23.82	0.19	0.78	
12	Daloa	0	317.85	0.89	24.97	0.27	0.72	1.07
	Kounahiri	1	345.91	0.20	27.91	0.19	0.61	
13	Bouafle	0	272.70	0.56	15.86	0.19	0.51	1.16
	Niakaramandougou	1	410.41	0.24	18.68	0.43	0.63	
14	Sassandra	0	233.72	0.10	22.28	0.19	0.42	1.20
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	
15	Issia	0	306.57	0.29	35.26	0.27	0.48	1.25
	Vavoua	1	376.97	0.09	29.56	0.27	0.47	

Note: I used a Mahalanobis distance matching technique as described in Nielsen (2016). This technique identifies most similar units by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance (Euclidean distance adjusted for covariance in the data) between pairs – it finds units that are close to each other in the

k -dimensional space defined by a selection of covariates.

A.3 Case selection: Post-treatment balance

Table A3: Balance test of matched pairs: post treatment variables

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value	N
<i>Intra-war variables</i>					
Violence against civilians, 2002-2008	1.12	1.08	0.05	0.96	21
Battles, 2002-2008	3.25	2.54	0.71	0.78	21
Count of aid projects, 2002-2005	1.38	1.08	0.30	0.79	21
Constant USD of aid projects, 2002-2005	1592400.38	1294106.77	298293.61	0.85	21
Number of int. aid orgs, 2006	1.38	1	0.38	0.81	21
R2 Incumbent vote share, 2010	0.48	0.57	-0.09	0.61	21
Violence against civilians, 2010-2011	0.38	0.62	-0.24	0.55	21
Battles, 2010-2011	0.75	0.69	0.06	0.93	21
<i>Post-war variables</i>					
Night lights, 2016	0.33	0.33	-0	0.99	21
2014 population	70421.88	107214.54	-36792.66	0.30	21
Akan, 2014	0.22	0.35	-0.13	0.36	21
Krou, 2014	0.29	0.26	0.03	0.84	21
South Mandé, 2014	0.15	0.11	0.04	0.65	21
Northern ethnic groups, 2014	0.33	0.28	0.05	0.74	21

Data sources: Violence: ACLED, 2017; 2010 electoral data: Ivorian Electoral Commission, 2010; Demographic variables: Ivorian Census, 2014; Number of aid projects: AidData 2017; Number of international organizations: Author's calculations based on UN maps of aid organizations; Nightlights: Goodman, BenYishay and Runfola (2017).

B Lab-in-the-Field

To build the population of civil society leaders from whom to select participants, I used several strategies.¹ I first begin with focal points from national networks in the 21 departments, including Regional Civil Society Centers established by the European Union, the West African Network for Peace, and a variety of local networks. Further, I contacted local offices of international donor organizations to

¹A full description of the sampling method can be found in Supplementary Appendix B.

determine with whom they had worked in the past and present. From these contacts, I built a snowball sample, asking those focal points to kindly share contact information of their peers. This was repeated until the list became saturated with no new individuals named, resulting in a population of 826 civil society leaders in the 21 departments. Research assistants called each contact and requested their participation in the project.

One concern about studying civil society leaders today is a possible selection problem: it could be that organizations that exist today or who have survived until today are led by individuals who are systematically different from those who created organizations before or during the war and which no longer exist, other than on paper. This would be particularly troublesome for this design if this were not balanced across the ZDC. To avoid this issue, research assistants asked snowball seeds to provide contact information for those leaders within their personal and professional networks who had previously been active, but no longer were. Of those in the snowball sample, 49 percent came from organizations on the rebel side, versus 51 percent on the government side; in other words, seeds on the rebel side were no more likely to suggest organizations to contact than seeds on the government side.

B.1 LITF locations

Participants were invited to attend a capacity-building workshop conducted in four locations: Bouaké, Daloa, Man, and San Pedro. Respondents could attend the workshop in their nearest regional capital, as shown in Figure A1. In each location, each workshop included at most 24 participants. The workshops were completed over 10 days in July 2018.




Figure A1: The location of the labs and the departments that participated in the each lab location.

B.2 Balance for LITF

Table A4: Balance table on individual level variables, lab sample

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N	min	max
Female	0.30	0.16	0.14	0.05	165	0	1
Over 35years	0.69	0.70	-0.01	0.89	166	0	1
Some secondary education	0.55	0.75	-0.20	0.01	157	0	1
Muslim	0.22	0.15	0.06	0.31	158	0	1
Northerner	0.34	0.22	0.12	0.10	162	0	1
Party ID is president's party	0.54	0.41	0.12	0.17	138	0	1
Income covers expenses	0.50	0.51	-0.01	0.90	156	0	1
Did not migrate during war	0.71	0.75	-0.04	0.62	161	0	1
Arrived during war	0.22	0.26	-0.04	0.55	156	0	1
Migrated during war	0.17	0.07	0.11	0.05	156	0	1
Only help if I benefit	0.23	0.14	0.09	0.17	156	0	1

Table A5: Balance table on NGO level variables, labs sample

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N	min	max
Founder	0.71	0.67	0.04	0.59	152	0	1
Worked in NGOs prior to current NGO	0.34	0.41	-0.07	0.36	155	0	1
Created before war	0.15	0.19	-0.04	0.54	156	0	1
Created during war	0.42	0.38	0.05	0.56	156	0	1
Internationally funded	0.33	0.53	-0.20	0.01	156	0	1
Natl headquarters	0.11	0.22	-0.11	0.05	155	0	1
Projects (count)	13.41	15.99	-2.58	0.57	156	0	100
Number of members	88.74	86.66	2.08	0.95	155	5	2000
Total domains	5.23	7.58	-2.35	0	156	0	23
Mission: Information provision	0.79	0.91	-0.12	0.04	156	0	1
Mission: private goods provision	0.41	0.49	-0.08	0.32	156	0	1
Mission: Public goods provision	0.42	0.49	-0.06	0.43	156	0	1
Local government partnerships	0.29	0.36	-0.07	0.37	156	0	1
National government partnerships	0.18	0.33	-0.15	0.03	156	0	1
Rural projects	0.82	0.84	-0.03	0.67	156	0	1

Table A6: Balance table on NGO domains

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N	min	max
Human rights	0.18	0.57	-0.38	0	156	0	1
Humanitarian	0.27	0.62	-0.35	0	156	0	1
Social Cohesion	0.59	0.58	0.01	0.87	156	0	1
Children	0.32	0.50	-0.18	0.02	156	0	1
Development	0.44	0.42	0.02	0.83	156	0	1
Women	0.33	0.54	-0.21	0.01	156	0	1
Health	0.35	0.47	-0.12	0.14	156	0	1

Table A7: Outcomes for imbalanced domains

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N
<i>Amount allocated to self</i>					
Humanitarian	0.65	0.54	0.11	0.04	74
Children	0.67	0.56	0.11	0.04	66
Women	0.73	0.57	0.16	0	71
<i>Amount allocated to outgroups</i>					
Humanitarian	0.32	0.39	-0.08	0.02	74
Children	0.27	0.38	-0.11	0	66
Women	0.26	0.39	-0.12	0	71

B.3 Additional Results

Round 3 facilitates a test of altruism, since respondents were forced to discriminate: either against themselves or one of the other two groups. Here I show that consistently across the three games in Round 3, CSO leaders from former-rebel controlled departments rarely discriminated against themselves, and if they did, they did so at lower rates than their counterparts in form-govt controlled departments.

Table A8: Rate of discrimination against self across games in Round 3

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N
Ethnicity game	0.18	0.40	-0.22	0	148
Partisanship game	0.18	0.33	-0.16	0.03	149
Department game	0.10	0.32	-0.22	0	147
All three games	0.08	0.19	-0.12	0.03	153
At least one game	0.25	0.50	-0.25	0	146




Figure A2: The share of respondents that discriminated at least once against outgroups during the games

B.4 Controlling for covariates, full regression

Table A9: Full regression controlling for individual and organizational covariates, share

	Percent allocated to self				Percent allocated to outgroups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.109*** (0.034)	0.121*** (0.042)	0.098*** (0.029)	0.106** (0.041)	−0.078*** (0.019)	−0.073*** (0.023)	−0.055*** (0.018)	−0.052** (0.024)
Sex		0.094*** (0.031)		0.125*** (0.033)		0.010 (0.017)		−05 (0.020)
Secondary education or higher		0.032 (0.033)		0.039 (0.033)		0.032 (0.026)		0.014 (0.020)
Northern ethnic group		−0.065* (0.037)		−0.060 (0.037)		0.022 (0.023)		0.046** (0.019)
Organization ever received international aid			0.033 (0.029)	0.032 (0.022)			−06 (0.014)	−06 (0.016)
National headquarters			−05 (0.050)	03 (0.051)			0.023 (0.019)	09 (0.017)
Total number of domains			−06 (04)	−05 (04)			−005 (02)	001 (02)
Created during the war			0.042 (0.044)	0.054 (0.042)			05 (0.035)	−0.014 (0.021)
Created after the war			0.147*** (0.034)	0.152*** (0.034)			−06 (0.030)	−0.028 (0.021)
Domain: Humanitarian			−0.025 (0.042)	−0.041 (0.040)			0.070** (0.029)	0.075** (0.027)
Org mission: information provision			−05 (0.049)	0.019 (0.031)			0.038 (0.031)	0.051** (0.019)
Constant	0.561*** (0.026)	0.533*** (0.035)	0.527*** (0.045)	0.461*** (0.049)	0.357*** (0.013)	0.331*** (0.023)	0.289*** (0.037)	0.278*** (0.044)
Observations	167	151	155	136	162	146	150	136
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A10: Regression with raw sums

	Sum allocated to self				Sum allocated to outgroups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	655.853*** (202.132)	727.306*** (249.099)	588.878*** (174.664)	635.821** (247.750)	−583.473*** (140.801)	−550.976*** (170.855)	−414.314*** (132.609)	−393.049** (178.675)
Observations	167	151	155	136	162	146	150	136
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

In the manuscript, for the discrimination measure, I calculate the share of the amount that respondents gave to outgroups out of the total amount that they could give away (7,500 FCFA). This measure is not perfectly negatively correlated with the amount kept (the altruism measure), since respondents could choose between three options – keeping the sum, giving to the outgroup, or giving to the in-group. Nevertheless, I present below a measure of discrimination that takes into account the amount

that the individual kept for themselves. Here, to measure discrimination I total the amount the respondent allocated to the outgroup as a share of the total amount not kept (so the denominator is 9,000 FCFA minus the amount not kept for self). I show that the results are still relatively robust, though with this alternative metric statistical significance is unstable under the most stringent set of controls.

Table A11: Outgroup analysis as share of amount that could be allocated to the outgroup

	Percent allocated to outgroup, out of remaining total			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	−0.062** (0.025)	−0.050* (0.025)	−0.037* (0.019)	−0.029 (0.022)
Observations	167	151	155	136
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C Other Robustness Checks

C.1 ZDC departments only

Here I exclude the outlying departments – Mankono, Niakaramandougou, San Pedro, Sassandra, and Tabou – and re-run the analysis. This allows for a comparison of just the departments surrounding the zone de confiance. The goal of this analysis is to reduce the imbalance on the cacao variable, which could be driving results. First, I show that the imbalance is reduced, though not completely eliminated. I then run the analysis with the full analysis showing the results still hold.

Table A12: Balance on cacao production

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-value	N
Cacao production	20626	63760.60	-43134.60	0.04	16

Table A13: Analysis excluding outlying departments

	Percent allocated to self				Percent allocated to outgroups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.111** (0.046)	0.116** (0.049)	0.120*** (0.039)	0.125** (0.043)	−0.078** (0.027)	−0.070** (0.030)	−0.071** (0.025)	−0.063* (0.030)
Observations	114	103	104	92	111	100	101	92
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C.2 Cacao production




Figure A3: Cacao production.

As can be seen by the figure above, all of the former government controlled departments are cacao production zones. This could be a problem if the leaders from these departments are more altruistic because they receive benefits from the cacao economy. To attempt to resolve this concern, I re-run the bivariate analysis below, controlling for private funding – a proxy for benefiting from the cacao economy. Results are robust to this control.

Table A14: Controlling for private funding

	Percent allocated to self	Percent allocated to outgroups
	(1)	(2)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.109*** (0.032)	−0.081*** (0.021)
fund_private	−0.071 (0.069)	0.040 (0.037)
Observations	167	156

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C.3 Violence analysis

Table A15: Analysis including violence

	Percent allocated to self	Percent allocated to outgroups
	(1)	(2)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.116*** (0.036)	−0.071*** (0.019)
violence exposure	−0.015 (0.031)	−0.027 (0.021)
Observations	161	156

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C.4 Ministry Partners analysis

Table A16: Analysis including ministry partnerships

	Percent allocated to self (1)	Percent allocated to outgroups (2)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.112*** (0.031)	−0.083*** (0.020)
Ministry partnerships	−0.030 (0.033)	0.013 (0.017)
Observations	156	151

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C.5 Wartime leaders

Important to understanding the outcomes presented here is being able to parse out whether these effects can adequately be attributed to the wartime experience of leaders. In the sample of leaders, some started working for their organization in the post-war period, others were too young to have been working in the sector during the war, and still others may have entered the sector in more recent years as the country stabilized. I posit that the behaviors that wartime civic leaders developed carry forward into the post-war period via institutional transmission: leaders pass on the behaviors and attitudes they learn to new entrants to the sector. Indeed, informants alluded to this fact during my interviews: what was learned was hard to overcome and leaders emulated what they had seen.

If institutional learning is true, then we would expect that post-war leaders behave similarly to wartime leaders. To test this hypothesis, I create a sample to include only those individuals who were leaders during the war (*wartime leaders*). These are two types of leaders: those who are the founder of their organization that started before or during the war, and those who currently work for an organization founded during the war and who have worked there since at least 2009 (before the war ended). This is a very conservative means to assess who constitutes a wartime leader, as it excludes leaders who perhaps started working in the sector prior to working with their current organization.² As seen in Tables A17 and A18, wartime leaders from former rebel-controlled departments are more egocentric and more discriminatory than wartime leaders from former government-controlled de-

²This is a result of poor survey design, where I did not ask respondents how long they worked in the civil society sector, instead only asking how long they worked for their *current* organization.

partments. Interestingly, leaders who are “postwar” are more egocentric than wartime leaders, but not more discriminatory.

Table A17: Wartime leader analysis - self

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	P-value	N
wartime leader	0.63	0.48	0	68
postwar leader	0.72	0.61	0.01	80

Table A18: Wartime leader analysis - outgroup

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	P-value	N
wartime leader	0.28	0.37	0	68
postwar leader	0.28	0.37	0	80

Table A19: Analysis using only the sample of “wartime leaders”

	Percent allocated to self				Percent allocated to outgroups			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Wartime leader from rebel depts	0.153*** (0.039)	0.170*** (0.053)	0.131** (0.051)	0.110** (0.043)	−0.079*** (0.025)	−0.097*** (0.029)	−0.053 (0.031)	−0.063 (0.040)
Observations	68	59	68	57	64	57	66	57
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Organization controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

C.6 Session effects

Table A20: Results with standard errors clustered at the session level (N=6)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Percent allocated to self	Percent allocated to outgroups
	(1)	(2)
Civil society leader from rebel depts	0.109** (0.031)	−0.078*** (0.016)
Constant	0.561*** (0.025)	0.357*** (07)
Observations	167	162

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.7 Minority analysis

Table A21: Outcomes for minority/northerners in Rebel areas

outcome	Minority group	Northerner	p-value	N
percent allocated to self	0.68	0.66	0.57	167
percent allocated to outgroup	0.28	0.28	0.97	162

Table A22: Outcomes for Christians/non-Christians in Rebel areas

outcome	Christians	Non-Christians	p-value	N
percent allocated to self	0.67	0.66	0.81	167
percent allocated to outgroup	0.29	0.28	0.72	162

D Selection Effects

D.1 Propensity Score Matching

The most prevalent alternative explanation could be that civil society leaders who are more egocentric and discriminatory selected into leadership in former rebel-controlled departments. That is, rebel control induced individuals who were already egocentric and discriminatory to start organizations, and thus explains the effect seen here. If this were true, it would render the comparison between civil society leaders in former rebel-controlled departments to those in former government-controlled departments moot because they are not actually comparable. Challenging this alternative explanation is not easy, as data collection was completed after the war. An ideal research design would have assigned leadership at random or would have collected data during the war period.

I examine whether there are underlying individual characteristics that caused more egocentric and discriminatory individuals to select into leadership in rebel-controlled districts, which are in turn driving the results. I perform propensity score matching using genetic matching to maximize covariate balance in the lab sample. I match on variables that were not balanced in the lab sample – gender, northern ethnicity, and education – and on whether an individual was a leader of an organization founded before the war. The idea is that by matching individuals based on their individual characteristics, we can compare most-similar individuals to each other, including on whether they were part of an organization that pre-dated rebel control. While not a perfect analysis, as there could be unobservable differences not matched upon that could account for the outcomes, it does get us closer to addressing the selection concern. Under propensity score matching, the results hold: leaders from former rebel-controlled departments are more likely to keep money for themselves, and to give less to the outgroup.

Table A23: Post-treatment matching: Effect of rebel control on altruism and discrimination

outcome	ATT
percent allocated to self	0.1096*** (0.0419)
percent allocated to outgroup	-0.0816*** (0.0285)

Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. N=130, 54 treated observations. Standard errors in parentheses. Matching on covariates: gender, northern ethnicity, education, organization started pre-war, and age.

D.2 Population Frame Analysis

I turn to the full population sample (N=826 leaders) to examine whether leaders and their organizations are systematically different from one side of the ZDC to the other. It is difficult to derive covariates from this sample, as the only information I have about the leaders in the population are their names, organization names, and locations. I derive ethnicity from the name of the leader, employing a common method of name-based ethnicity classification based on the 2014 Ivorian Census. I also used the names to code gender. I then used the name of the organization to determine their domain. This is not a perfect method, because the population list includes organizations that only listed their name's acronym, that do not include the domain in their name, and that work in several domains.

This method is useful when ethnicity self-identification information is not available. The reference population is the 2014 Ivorian Census, which collects both first and last names of respondents as well as their ethnic identity. I estimated probabilities that a given name was one of five language groups in Côte d'Ivoire: Akan, Krou, North Mandé, South Mandé or Voltaïque. I then applied the highest probability language group to the name in the civil society leader population frame, the target population. I only include exact matches, resulting in a match for 71 percent of the frame, with an average accuracy match of 82 percent.

Second, I used two methods to determine the gender of the organization leader. I coded the leader as a woman if they included "Madame," "Epse," or "Née" in their title, which indicate if the individual is a married woman. I then had an Ivorian research assistant hand code for names that are traditionally female. Through this method, we were able to code 94 percent of the sample for gender.

Third, I used the name of the organization to determine their domain. This is not a perfect method, because the population list includes organizations that only listed their name's acronym, that do not include the domain in their name, and that work in several domains. Nevertheless, I coded for whether the organization focused on women's issues (included "femme" in the organization name) and health (included "SIDA" or "Santé" in the name). For the former, being a woman leader is not predictive of running a women's organization (there is a correlation of -0.012, indicating that men are commonly leaders of women's organization). The dataset employed in this analysis aggregates the leaders up to their organization (the population frame sometimes includes multiple leaders for the same organization, such as the president and vice-president).

Table A24 presents the results of difference-in-means tests for these four variables. Northerners are no more likely to run organizations in former rebel-controlled departments than former government-

controlled areas. Similarly, for the two domains I code, there is no difference across the ZDC. Women are slightly more represented in the rebel-controlled department population. Although this is not a perfect test of the selection alternative explanation, it does give some evidence that the population of civil society leaders under rebel-control are not much different on observable characteristics from those under government-control.

Table A24: Analysis of population frame

	Rebel	Govt	p-value	N
Northerner	0.40	0.38	0.71	823
Woman	0.53	0.47	0.09	823
Women's organization	0.12	0.10	0.47	626
Health organization	0.02	0.02	0.98	626

This analysis provides evidence that egocentric or discriminatory leaders were not selecting into leadership under rebel control. Instead, rebel control changed the behaviors and attitudes of leaders, inducing them to be more egocentric and discriminatory.

E Follow-up Survey

Participants of the labs were re-contacted via email in 2021. They were encouraged to participate in a survey where the results were disseminated and I assessed their perceptions of the results. Seventy-eight leaders participated in the survey (47% response rate). Unfortunately, I cannot determine if there is differential attrition with respect to rebel vs. government-controlled participants, as I did not collect any identifiable information to track participation. The survey can be seen [here](#).

Table A25: Follow-up survey, summary statistics for key variables, Full sample

description	mean	min	max	std.dev	n
personal only	0.06	0	1	0.24	84
both perso/org	0.23	0	1	0.42	84
org only	0.71	0	1	0.45	84
Guess - altruism same	0.35	0	1	0.48	82
Guess - discrimination same	0.41	0	1	0.50	80
Guess - altruism correct	0.29	0	1	0.46	82
Guess - discrimination correct	0.29	0	1	0.46	80
Not surprised by Altruism finding	0.43	0	1	0.50	79
Not surprised by Discrimination finding	0.48	0	1	0.50	79
Altruism finding - agree	0.63	0	1	0.49	79
Discrimination finding - agree	0.57	0	1	0.50	74

Table A26: Comparing follow-up respondents from former-rebel vs. former-govt zones

var	Rebel	Govt	p-value	min	max	N
Guess - altruism correct	0.32	0.24	0.49	0	1	82
Guess - discrimination correct	0.33	0.25	0.53	0	1	80
Not surprised by Altruism finding	0.50	0.37	0.34	0	1	79
Not surprised by Discrimination finding	0.54	0.42	0.38	0	1	79

Table A27: Reasons for findings

description	mean	min	max	std.dev	n
CSO leaders lived in uncertainty	0.71	0	1	0.46	75
CSO leaders are poorer	0.61	0	1	0.49	74
CSO leaders get less aid	0.55	0	1	0.50	75
CSO leaders are corrupt	0.47	0	1	0.50	76
CSO leaders are victims of discrimination	0.58	0	1	0.50	76

F Hawthorne and Demand Effects

Another valid concern would be Hawthorne effects – that the civic leaders knew they were part of a study – or demand effects – that the leaders knew what answers the researchers expected. Research has indeed shown that in lab games in developing countries, participants whose villages had longer exposure to international aid were more likely to behave differently in the presence of an American (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi, 2015). There are two ways that my presence could affect the results: first, participants may want to appear more generous in front of a Westerner, as found in the

above-mentioned study. Second, civic leaders may think the games are a means for testing their aid suitability, and may act in such a way to demonstrate that they or their organization are in need of aid funding. In an exit survey, respondents were asked Why do you think the researchers had you do these activities? Response options were: to give money to civic leaders in a fun way; to test civic leaders, to see which civic leaders are more deserving of aid; to find out more how civic leaders interact with each other. Twenty-five percent of respondents believed that the games were a means to assess aid suitability, while over 70 percent responded that the games were a means to find out more how civic leaders interact with each other. There is no relationship between amount allocated to self or to the outgroup and believing that the games were a means for testing their aid suitability. It does not appear that the respondents were trying to impress the researcher and demonstrate more need for aid through their actions in the games.

Regarding demand effects, it does seem that respondents were cognizant about giving to non-co-ethnics in a way they were not in giving to non-co-partisans; as can be seen in Table 2 in the main text, every respondent allocated at least 100 FCFA to their non-co-ethnics. Indeed, the ethnic nature of the conflict and the continued political polarization along ethnic lines may explain why ethnicity might have been particularly salient in respondents' minds. However, we would expect demand effects to work across treatment assignment; meaning, we would expect those from rebel zones to act the same, on average, as their government counterparts if they were indeed able to figure out the goal of the games. As the results demonstrate, this is not the case: those in rebel-zones are significantly less likely to give to non-coethnics.

G Ethics Statement

G.1 Lab-in-the-field

Prior to completing survey 1, respondents voluntarily consented in French to participation in the study online in the Qualtrics platform. If they attended the lab-in-the-field, they voluntarily consented in French to the second survey and the lab games at the start of the workshop, also online in the Qualtrics platform. All participants at the labs were given a copy of the consent for them to keep. There was no deception involved in this study. This study received IRB approval at the researcher's university.

As described in the main text, lab-in-the-field participants were compensated for their travel (ranging from \$1-\$18 depending on their location), lunch (\$4), and were able to earn up to \$20 in participating

in the games during the study. This amounted to three times the minimum wage salary, which was intended to make the games/activities enticing to the participants. This amount, however, is similar to a standard per diem for NGO leaders who participate in similar workshops offered by international actors.

G.2 Interviews

Interviewees also consented verbally to participation in the study and were given a copy of the consent to keep at the start of the interview. Interviewees were not compensated for their participation in the study. Interviews were conducted in two waves: the first set of locations were selected based on geographic variation, with one location from the west, southwest, center, and northeast of Côte d'Ivoire (Man, San Pedro, Bouaké, and Bondoukou) in 2017. The second wave (2018) consisted of interviews in nine of the 21 departments selected using the matching case selection strategy described in the main text. I selected civil society leaders to interview in these 11 locations from existing lists of civil society organizations as well as from personal contacts, and some were reached by snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted in French and either in the offices or homes of the civil society leaders. The interviews were semi-structured and covered topics such as the type of work the organization completes, difficulties accessing their constituents, difficulty working with local government today, funding, and their experiences living during the civil war and electoral violence. Respondents were willing to share their war experiences often unprompted.

H Anonymized Pre-Analysis Plan

Pre-registered 22 July 2018

Disrupted Governance:

Legacies of Civil War and NGO Leader Behavior in Post-Conflict Côte d'Ivoire

Abstract

Local Non-governmental organization (NGO) leaders are often seen as first responders by citizens and international donors during civil wars, where they have to navigate polarized contexts, threats of violence, and determine on-the-fly whom can be trusted and coordinated with in order to provide services to the population (Belloni 2008; Ottaway 2003; Posner 2004; Goodhand 2006; Uvin 1998). The survival strategies NGO leaders employed during disruptions in power evoked by civil war may have significant, long-lasting effects on their behavior after the conflict has ended.

How do subnational disruptions in governance during civil war shape local NGO leaders' behavior after the conflict has ended? In my dissertation, I develop a theory in which disruptions in governance evoke institutional instability for leaders of local organizations, while also affecting their behavioral and psychological responses to future democratic practice. To test this theory, this project draws on a multi-methods approach, leveraging subnational variation in legacies of rebel governance, survey and lab-in-the-field experiments with civil society organization leaders, and a paired comparison of departments with varying levels of civil society strength in Western Côte d'Ivoire.

This pre-analysis plan describes one part of the project that will examine the behaviors and attitudes of Ivorian NGO leaders in former rebel and government regions of Côte d'Ivoire, utilizing surveys and a lab-in-the-field experimental (LITFE) design.

Introduction

This study uses a lab-in-the-field experimental (LITFE) design to assess whether disruptions in governance during civil war affect local NGO leaders' relationships with other NGO leaders, donors, citizens, and politicians. Employing a statistical matching case selection strategy, NGO leaders from 21 departments in Côte d'Ivoire are invited to participate in a series of dictator games and survey experiments to assess whether subnational variation in governance affect the strategies they employ in carrying out their democracy and development activities.

I define disruption in governance as a moment in which power in a given locality changes hands unexpectedly and in which it is uncertain how long the power change will last. It is a disruption because at the onset it is not clear whether this new system of governance will persist or if there will be a reversion back to prior structures. Civilians have to deal with insecurity, uncertainty and confusion about who is governing and the nature of rule of law.

I focus on one type of disruption³: the takeover of territory by rebels. An emerging literature has begun to examine rebel governance and wartime politics during civil wars, in which citizens under rebel control are exposed to new institutions and power dynamics (Arjona 2015; Mampilly 2011; Huang 2016; Weinstein 2006). When rebels succeed in wresting local power and territory from the state, they can choose to use violence selectively or indiscriminately, establish governance institutions, and/or provide public goods to citizens under their control. Indeed, these movements often seek to destroy the legitimacy of the state and to establish a rival regime, creating parallel hierarchies (Mampilly 2011, 13). Although experience with rebel governance may not be uniform across a territory, I argue that the *effect* of disruption remains similar for civilians.

I predict that NGO leaders who experienced this type of disruption in governance via rebel control are more likely to employ partisanship and co-ethnic strategies to reach constituents and interact with government officials, less able to coordinate with other NGOs, and more likely to be aid dependent than their counterparts working in government-controlled areas.

This project aims to provide micro-level assessments of the impact of civil war on NGO leaders, key actors encouraged and supported by the international community to foster positive development

³Civil war, whether it is a fight for control of the central state or for secession, represents a violent political conflict in which power is inherently contested. Disruptions in power can take on many forms during civil war, and is not limited to rebel takeover or government maintenance of power. Coups, international protectorates, zones of demarcation or confidence, and partitioning all represent instances where citizens are exposed to parallel or competing structures of power and governance, either for the duration of fighting or shorter periods of time. When the war ceases, and the central government (either now ruled by the incumbent or by those non-state actors) regains the lost territory and reestablishes their legitimacy and governance system, citizens are exposed to a new, or re-instated power structure.

and democracy outcomes in countries emerging from conflict. This project, like others before it (i.e. farmers' associations, Grossman and Baldassarri 2012), examines subjects who are part of existing groups, namely leaders of NGOs in Côte d'Ivoire. It follows in the tradition of and contributes to other studies using LITFE that attempt to isolate the effect of violence and exposure to civil war on behavior (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012).

Research Design

Côte d'Ivoire is a West African country that experienced a civil war from 2002-2011. During the war period, rebels controlled at least 50% of the national territory, administering these regions with varying degrees of governance structures and rule of law. The war ended in a negotiated settlement and the rebel-supported candidate won the presidential elections that were part of the peace agreement provisions in 2010. The election resulted in violent confrontation between rebels and government forces after both candidates declared themselves the winner.⁴ Côte d'Ivoire does not represent a unique or particularly idiosyncratic case: it joins the ranks of at least nine prior civil wars in its nature as a center-seeking civil war in which rebels held territory and their preferred political party won political power after the war (Huang 2016; Dresden 2017).

Because the independent variable of interest here, disruptions in governance via rebel control, was not assigned at random for this case, I employ statistical matching (Nielsen 2016; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014) to find "most similar" departments selecting on "pre-treatment" variables that are associated with rebel control. The "treatment" variable is whether or not the department was part of the 10 *comzones* administered by the rebels in 2002. To create the sample of matched departments, I conditioned on five pre-treatment covariates: distance of the department capital to Abidjan (the economic capital), vote share against the incumbent president in 2001 municipal elections, percent of population that identified as from northern ethnic groups (North Mandé and Voltaïque) from the 1998 census, average night lights for 2000, and average child mortality rates from 2000 (see tables PAP1 and PAP2 in the Appendix). These variables all relate to reasons the rebellion was started: discontent with the central government discriminating against northerners and contestation over citizenship laws.

This yields a matched sample of 21 departments: eight formerly rebel-controlled and 14 formerly

⁴Because this violence occurred after peace agreements were signed, civil war datasets such as UDCP and COW code it as a second civil war, whereas some argue it is a continuation of the war itself (McGovern 2011; Balcells 2017), while still others argue that the electoral violence was a political crisis distinct from the war (Straus 2011). For this project, I examine both periods of violence.

government-controlled in Côte d'Ivoire (See Figure A4).⁵




Figure A4: Côte d'Ivoire. Gray zones are rebel-controlled territories (2002-2011), white zones are government-controlled. Black outlines are selected cases. Boxed cities are lab locations. Yamoussoukro and Abidjan are the political and economic capitals, respectively. Black dotted lines represent the *zone de confiance*.

Sample

I first administer a survey (hereafter, Survey 1) to 500 NGO leaders across 21 selected departments via email and telephone, collecting data on: aid flows to the organization, where the organization works, how long the organization has existed, how long the individual has worked in this domain, and whether the leader is from the region originally. I define a leader as anyone who holds or has

⁵Departments are the second lowest administrative unit (N=108: rebel = 41, government = 67). NGOs register at this level with many becoming members of departmental networks.

held an executive position in a formally registered organization. I use a snow-ball sampling method to contact current and former leaders in each department.

I then invite these leaders to participate in the lab-in-the-field described below (in section H), where participants complete a second survey (Survey 2) in which they answer 50 questions to flesh out alternative explanations and possible mechanisms (described in section H).

Dependent Variables

I argue that disruptions in governance affect four aspects that are important to the success of NGO leaders' work: their relationships with other NGOs, donors, political leaders, and citizens in their communities. Using survey experiments and lab games, I test NGO leader responses to different stimuli related to these relationships.

Experiments 1 and 2 are in Survey 1, while experiments 3 and 4 are in Survey 2. All outcomes are measured on a seven-point scale, unless noted otherwise.

DV 1: Cooperation

In the first experiment described below, I examine whether NGO leaders are more or less likely to desire to cooperate with other NGO leaders in their departments. Observationally, I measure this dependent variable using questions 3e, 4e, 5-11 in Survey 2.

"Imagine an international organization is seeking applicants for a two-year project about building social cohesion and peace in Côte d'Ivoire. The project requires outreach efforts to citizens and dialogue with local government officials to be successful.

Treatment: *In order to apply, civil society organizations have to write a proposal in which your organization must demonstrate that it will work with at least five different organizations from [Respondent Department] to create and implement the program.*

Outcomes:

1. How likely would you be to apply for this project?
2. If you received this project, how difficult would you say it would be to work with: citizens, government, other NGOs?

3. If you received this project, how likely would you say it would succeed at its stated objectives of achieving social cohesion in [Respondent Department]?

DV2: Donor Dependence

In the next experiment, I aim to test whether NGO leaders are dependent on international aid and are willing to forgo their commitments to local development demands for international aid appeals. Observationally, I measure donor dependence in survey 1 with questions 29a and d, 30, 31, and 32.

“The EU has recently stated that one of their top priorities for civil society development in Côte d’Ivoire is the environment.

Treatment: *Ivorians, in contrast, do not see the environment as a top problem that they face. In a 2017 survey, they mentioned unemployment and poverty as the most pressing issues they think should be improved (Afrobarometer 2017).*

Outcome: If the EU were to solicit funding applications for a 21 million FCFA project about the environment, how likely would you be to apply for this project?

DV3: Relationship with Government

In this experiment, I examine the likelihood of an NGO leader to succumb to using partisanship when interacting with political leaders. I assess this DV observationally using questions 16, 44, 45, and 47 from the Survey 1 and questions 4a-e and 6c.

Prompt

[Imagine that the current mayor in your town is from the SAME/DIFFERENT/ political party as you.]
You need the mayor in your town’s support on a project your organization is working on.

Outcomes

1. What is the likelihood that you would:
 - (a) let the mayor know your political affiliation?
 - (b) invite the mayor to a planning workshop for your project?
 - (c) attend a civil society meeting that the mayor had called?

2. How likely would you say other organizations in DEPT are to implement this strategy?
3. How much do you agree with the following statements:
 - (a) Letting the mayor know my political affiliation would put our organization at an advantage with respect to other similar organizations
 - (b) Letting the mayor know my political affiliation would make my future work more difficult
4. Now imagine that this mayor wanted to offer a subsidy to an organization in your department to conduct human rights related work. But the mayor says that he will only give the money to those whom will promise to write a positive report. What is the likelihood that other organizations in your department would take the money and write the positive report, even if it is not true?

DV4: Relationship with citizens

The next set of vignettes aims to understand when NGO leaders are willing to cast aside their expected neutrality and discriminate in how they provide services to populations.

The first set of games (described in section H) serve to measure behaviorally when and whether NGO leaders are willing to discriminate in favor for their ethnicity or partisanship.

Co-ethnic Prompt

You are administering a health education campaign in a village where your organization has not worked before. *[The population is FROM YOUR ETHNIC GROUP/NOT co-ethnic]*

Co-partisan Prompt

You are administering a voter education campaign in a village where your organization has not worked before. *[The population is FROM YOUR POLITICAL PARTY/NOT co-partisan]*

Outcomes

1. What is the likelihood that you would:
 - (a) say that your organization would be successful in encouraging citizen involvement in its activities in this village?
 - (b) let the citizens know your own political/ethnic identity?

2. How much do you agree with the following statements:
 - (a) Letting the villagers know my political/ethnic identity would put our organization at an advantage with respect to other similar organizations
 - (b) Letting the villagers know my political/ethnic identity would make my future work more difficult
3. We understand that sometimes you do not have enough money to go everywhere to carry-out education campaigns. If you had a limited budget, what is the likelihood that you would exclude this village from your planning?

Analysis

The multivariate specification is:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 rebel_d + \beta_2 treatment_i + \beta_3 rebel_d * treatment_i + \epsilon_i$$

Where Y_i is one of the outcomes described above, $rebel_d$ is a dummy for whether an individual is from a former rebel-controlled department, $treatment_i$ is a dummy for whether an individual was assigned to treatment in a experiment, and $rebel_d * treatment_i$ is the coefficient of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the department level.

Expectations

Leaders in rebel-controlled departments are less likely to apply for grants that require cooperation with other NGOs than those in government-controlled departments. In other words, treatment decreases interest in applying for those rebel-controlled department leaders relative to those rebel-controlled that receive the control condition as well as relative to those government-controlled who receive treatment.

Leaders in rebel-controlled departments are less likely to care about Ivorians' interests compared to donor priorities: leaders in government-controlled departments are less likely to apply for the grant after receiving treatment than those treated in rebel-controlled departments.

Similarly, I expect leaders in former rebel-controlled departments to be more likely to discriminate in their administration of services than their government-controlled dwelling counterparts.

The LITF and Games

Scope Condition: Capacity Building Workshop

From the first survey, I invite approximately 12 NGO leaders from each department to attend a capacity-building workshop in the nearest regional capital (as shown on figure A4). Under the guise of the workshop, participants will engage in the lab games described below.⁶ Each workshop/lab will include at most 24 participants. The total expected sample of lab participants is 252.

The lab is embedded in a capacity building workshop, in which I and a team of research assistants present sessions on volunteer culture and fund-raising strategies to NGO leaders. The workshop might prime leaders to be more altruistic or cooperative. However, I posit that this scope condition actually introduces more realism and possibly makes the findings somewhat more externally valid since NGO leaders spend much of their time attending similar workshops across the continent.

The lab and workshop will last for a maximum of four hours. Participants will be paid for their transportation and lunch. Over the course of the lab, they will be able to win/earn up to 13,500 FCFA (\$25), the equivalent of more than four times a day's salary at the official minimum wage. All of the games will be played at the end of the session, using the Qualtrics interface on tablets, and the participants will collect their winnings at the end of the session.

Both sets of games measure how altruistic an individual is (the original goal of the game). The first games assess how willing an individual is to discriminate in favor of their own communities (as described in section H) while the second set of games assesses how willing leaders are to share with other similar organizations (as described in section H).

Below I describe the two sets of laboratory games and their expected outcomes.

Individual Characteristics Dictator Game

In the first set of games, similar to Habyarimana et al. (2009), each respondent will be presented with two village associations with varying characteristics.

Participants will be given the choice to either allocate to themselves or :

⁶The games in Qualtrics can be found [here](#) in French

1. An association from their department/not from their department
2. An association with the majority of members as the same ethnicity/not same ethnicity
3. An association with the majority of members as the same political identity /not same political identity


In the first round, respondents will choose to allocate 1000 FCFA in 100 FCFA coins to themselves or to two village associations with each of the characteristics above.

In round two, the three games will be played again, but the participant may only keep 500 FCFA for themselves; they must allocate the rest to the two associations.

Finally, in the third round, they will be told they have two 500 FCFA coins, and that no individual (including themselves) can get both coins. They will thus have to discriminate when selecting who they will allocate the money to (of course, they may also discriminate against themselves).

The respondents will complete a total of 9 games. For each round, respondents will allocate 3000 FCFA. In round 1, the most that an individual will win is 3000 FCFA. In rounds 2 and 3, the most they will win is 1500 FCFA. The respondents will complete each round twice, for a total possible winnings from this game of 6000 FCFA.

Respondents will be instructed that the money will be allocated to a randomly selected recipient association after all of the workshops are completed.



Veuillez répartir les 1000 FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA aux entités ci dessous selon votre préférence.

Vous même	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Une association dont les membres partagent vos opinions politiques	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Une association dont les membres ne partagent pas vos opinions politiques	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Total	0

Veuillez répartir les 1000 FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA à chaque des entités decrits selon votre préférence, **mais cette fois, vous pouvez garder au maximum 500 FCFA pour vous même.**

Vous même	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Une association de votre département	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Une association d'un département different du vôtre	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Total	0

Figure A5: An example of how participants will see the games in rounds 1 and 2. On the left is an example from round 1 – English: Please allocate 1000 FCFA below in 100 FCFA coins to the entities below according to your preferences (Options are: yourself, an association whose members share your political opinions, an association whose members do not share your political opinions). On the right is an example from round 2 – English: **but this time, you can only keep 500 FCFA for yourself.** (Options are: yourself, an association in your department, an association in a different department).



Veuillez repartir les 1000 FCFA en pièces de 500 FCFA à chaque des entités decrits selon votre préférence, **mais cette fois, personne ne peut garder les deux pieces de 500FCFA.**

	Vous même	Une association dont les membres partagent vos opinions politiques	Une association dont les membres ne partagent pas vos opinions politiques
500	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
500	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Figure A6: An example of how participants will see the games in round 3. English: Please allocate 1000 FCFA but this time, no person can keep both 500 FCFA coins.

Network Dictator Game

Participants will also complete a series of a modified version of a dictator game (similar to Goist and Kern 2018), similar to the games played earlier. Participants will be allocated up to 1000 FCFA in 100 CFA coins of which they can, anonymously, give some of the sum to the central pot, keep all of it themselves or keep half and donate the rest to a central pot. In this version, the pot will represent a matched donation to networks in the country.

In round one, participants will choose how much to allocate of 500 FCFA to themselves or to one of the following entities (they will be presented with each entity in each round for a total of five games per round):

Participants will be given the choice to either allocate to themselves or :

1. A departmental network in their department
2. A regional network in their region
3. The regional center for civil society that represents their department
4. A national network
5. A network of their choosing, that they are a member of (write in the name)

In round two, play will proceed as round one, but participants will choose how to allocate 1000 FCFA instead of 500 FCFA.

Each respondent will complete 10 games, with a total possible winning for the individual of 7500 FCFA.



Veuillez répartir les 500FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA à des entités ci dessous selon votre préférence.

Vous Même	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Un Réseau National	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/>

Figure A7: An example of how participants will see the games in round 1. English: Please allocate 500 FCFA in 100 FCFA coins to the below entities according to your preferences. (Options are: yourself, a national network).



Veuillez repartir les 1000FCFA en pièces de 100 FCFA à des entités ci dessous selon votre préférence.

Vous Même	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Un Réseau National	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Total	<input type="text" value="0"/>

Figure A8: An example of how participants will see the games in round 2.

Measurement Strategy

Results will be analyzed employing difference-in-means tests and regression analysis. I estimate the causal effect of rebel control on the game outcomes described above with the following specification:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 rebel_d + \epsilon_i$$

where $rebel_d$ is an indicator for rebel controlled departments and ϵ_i is an individual-level error term. Standard errors will be clustered at the department level.

There are several measures for the game outcomes: the amount kept, total amount given to same groups, the amount allocated to other groups, a dichotomous measure of whether anything is shared, and a dichotomous measure of whether 50% or more is given when able.

Expectations

I expect NGO leaders living in former rebel-controlled areas to be more likely to discriminate against non-co-ethnics and non-co-partisans than those in government-controlled areas.

I also expect NGO leaders living in former rebel-controlled zones to be less altruistic than those in government-controlled areas.

I expect NGO leaders from rebel-controlled departments to demonstrate wariness towards networks and to allocate less money to networks outside of their departments. The intuition behind the hypothesis for this game is that those NGO leaders who lived through a chaotic, distrustful period of civil war (under rebel control), are less likely to desire to cooperate and work with like-minded actors; they are more interested in “going it alone”.

Mechanisms and Robustness

I posit that there are four main mechanisms from the civil war linking disrupted governance to subsequent NGO leader behavior: fear, uncertainty about the rule of law and security, experienced violence, and aid flows. I predict that the effect of rebel control on NGO leader behaviors is stronger among individuals who were very fearful during the war, lacked certitude about who was in charge, experienced violence, and whose organization was affected by ebbs and flows in donor aid during the war. I collect information on the participants’ experience during the war in Survey 2, questions 12-29. The responses to these questions will be used to create an index of experience with disrupted governance.

Finally, I will also use multivariate models to look at individual characteristics for the amount sent in the games: there may be key differences, for example, between how much men and women allocate, or in those who are older (Bahry and Wilson 2006; Whitt and Wilson 2007).

Appendices

Table PAP1: Balance test on covariates, pre-matching

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value
Distance to Abidjan, km ^{viii}	483.15	225.54	257.61	0.00***
Anti-Incumbent, 2001 ^{ix}	0.63	0.49	0.14	0.00***
Night Lights, 2000 ⁱⁱ	0.33	0.85	-0.52	0.00***
Child Mortality, 2000 ⁱⁱ	41.07	26.22	14.85	0.00***
Northern Ethnic Groups, 1998 ⁱ	0.68	0.23	0.45	0.00***

Table PAP2: Balance test on covariates, after matching

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value
Distance to Abidjan, km	392.97	325.53	67.44	0.02*
Anti-Incumbent, 2001	0.47	0.54	-0.07	0.44
Night Lights, 2000	0.35	0.33	0.02	0.90
Child Mortality, 2000	28.03	24.89	3.14	0.46
Northern Ethnic Groups, 1998	0.32	0.25	0.07	0.49

Because I am measuring my dependent variables during the post-conflict period, one might expect that there have been significant changes since the war ended. Below, in Table PAP3, I examine whether there is balance between the matched “treated” and “control” departments on intra-war and post-war variables. The differences between “treated” and “control” are not statistically significant for any of these variables.¹

¹ Child mortality data is unavailable after 2000.

Table PAP3: Balance test of matched pairs

Variable	Mean Rebel	Mean Govt	Diff	P-Value
<i>Pre-war variables</i>				
Akan, 1998 ⁱ	0.24	0.36	-0.12	0.15
Krou, 1998 ⁱ	0.13	0.24	-0.11	0.08
South Mandé, 1998 ⁱ	0.30	0.14	0.17	0.13
1998 population ⁱ	523516.12	574791.54	-51275.41	0.41
Land inequality, gini coefficient ^x	0.58375	0.73000	-0.14625	0.12
Health centers per 1000 inhabitants, 2001 ^{xi}	0.11	0.12	-0.01	0.68
Average 10-year rainfall, in ⁱⁱ	104.07	113.89	-9.33	0.41
Cacao production ⁱⁱⁱ	15469.50	58663.62	-43194.12	0.01*
Distance to lootable gold, km ⁱ	226024.58	192282.12	33742.47	0.31
<i>Intra-war variables</i>				
Violence against civilians, 2002-2008 ^{iv}	1.12	1.08	0.05	0.96
Battles, 2002-2008 ^{iv}	5.50	2.54	2.96	0.30
Count of aid projects, 2002-2005 ^v	1.38	1.15	0.22	0.88
Constant USD of aid projects, 2002-2005 ^v	1592400.38	1294106.77	298293.61	0.85
Number of international humanitarian organizations, 2006	1.38	1.00	.38	0.81
Round 2, Incumbent vote share, 2010 ^{vi}	0.48	0.57	-0.09	0.64
Violence against civilians, 2010-2011 ^{iv}	0.38	0.62	-0.24	0.55
Battles, 2010-2011 ^{iv}	0.75	0.69	0.06	0.93
<i>Post-war variables</i>				
Night Lights, 2016 ^{vii}	0.33	0.33	-0.00	0.99
2014 population ^{vii}	70421.88	107214.54	-36792.66	0.30
Akan, 2014 ^{vii}	0.22	0.35	-0.13	0.36
Krou, 2014 ^{vii}	0.29	0.26	0.03	0.84
South Mandé, 2014 ^{vii}	0.15	0.11	0.04	0.65
Northern ethnic groups, 2014 ^{vii}	0.34	0.28	0.05	0.74

Data sources: (i) Ivorian Census, 1998 (RGHP); (ii) Goodman, BenYishay and Runfola (2017); (iii) Ministère de l'agriculture et des ressources animales; Annuaire 1997 des statistiques agricoles; Direction des statistiques; de la documentation et de l'informatique; République de Côte d'Ivoire; Edition de novembre 1998; (iv) ACLED, 2017; (v) C; (vi) Ivorian Electoral Commission, 2010; (vii) Ivorian Census, 2014; (viii) Author calculations; (ix) Bouquet (2008); (x) inequality of land ownership. Dabalen et al. (2012). (xi) Statistiques des infrastructures publiques de santé par région et par district en 2009, INS and Carte Sanitaire 2008 de la Côte d'Ivoire, Direction de l'information, de la planification et de l'évaluation.

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