



FINALIST FOR
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

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EXECUTIVE COALITIONS AND CONGRESS: INDUCING COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS

Why do executive agencies form policymaking coalitions? Legislative coalitions are widely theorized and studied, but less attention has been paid to executive coalitions. Executive agencies' dependence on the political branches calls for a distinctive theory of coalition building. This article presents such a theory, arguing that agencies form coalitions to optimize their autonomy given their subordinate position in a separation of powers system by exploiting and inducing collective action problems in Congress. Using data on dozens of agencies over seventeen years, I find that agencies are most likely to form coalitions when it helps them induce collective action problems among their overseers in Congress: namely, committee freeriding in oversight and gridlock in lawmaking. Agencies form coalitions actively in order to insulate their policies against congressional oversight.

TIME

Monday, Nov. 28, 2022
12:15-1:45PM

LOCATION

HMNSS 1503

ZOOM DETAILS

Meeting ID: 921 0526 5035
Passcode: 848314