

## *Two Negations: Fear of Being Excluded and the Logic of Self-Esteem*

NAOKI SAKAI

Another season of the concentration camp seems to be descending upon us.<sup>1</sup> Now one is all the more conscious of one's own vulnerability as a second-class citizen of the United States who could potentially be deprived of a United States' nationality or right to legal residence by official decree. American politics and mass media expediently promote an anxiety that America, the last super-power of an imperial nature, has turned into the symbolic target of anti-colonial vengeance.<sup>2</sup> This assessment in turn justifies the Federal Administration's insatiable search across the globe for signs attesting to imminent attacks by "terrorists." As long as the public buys this paranoid formula, a state of emergency can easily be linked to a global colonial war, and spread throughout an entire civil population.

In reference to the *campos de concentraciones* by the Spanish in Cuba and the "concentration camps" by the English in South Africa, Giorgio Agamben gives an historical account of how the concentration camps were inaugurated around the beginning of the last century. The camps were "born not out of ordinary law (even less, as one might have supposed, from a transformation and development of criminal law) but out of a state of exception and martial law. This is even clearer in the Nazi *Lager*, concerning whose origins and juridical regime we are well informed. It has been noted that the juridical basis for internment was not common law but *Schutzhaft* (literally, protective custody), a juridical institution of Prussian origin that the Nazi jurors sometimes classified as a preventive police measure insofar as it allowed individuals to be 'taken into custody' independently of any criminal behavior, solely to avoid danger to the security of the state" (166-67). The concentration camp itself was a pre-emptive measure taken by the State to prevent threats to the security of the state from actualizing.

As Hannah Arendt assessed it a half-century ago, the decline of nation-state sovereignty was accompanied by the decline of the rights of man. It seems that

<sup>1</sup> This manuscript was originally prepared for the volume entitled *Contemporary Japanese Thought* (ed. Richard Calichman, Columbia UP). I would like to thank Columbia University Press for allowing me to publish this article before the publication of the volume. In writing this essay, I adopted much from two of my published articles, "Hutatsu no hitei: No-No-Boy wo yomu (Two Negations: A Reading of *No-No-Boy*)" in *Shisô no Kagaku* 125 (1990): 114-126 [Reprinted in *Shisan sareru Nigongo-Nigonjin (The Stillbirth of the Japanese)* (Tokyo: Shinyô-sha, 1996: 99-126)] and "Nihonjin dearu koto: taminzoku kokka ni okeru kokumin shutai no kôchiku no mondai to tanabe hajime no 'shu no ronri' (Being Japanese: the problem of the construction of national subject in a multi-ethnic state and Tanabe Hajime's 'Logic of the Species')" in *Shisô* 882 (1997): 5-48 [English translation, "Subject and Substratum: on Japanese Imperial Nationalism", *Cultural Studies* 14.3/4 (2000): 462-530].

<sup>2</sup> The document that most explicitly presents this colonial paranoia is the Bush Administration's "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (September 2002).

this formula is being ascertained once again. We have to deal with more and more organizations which are neither national nor international as the class struggles and classes themselves can no longer be integrated and confined into and by the nation-form.<sup>3</sup> Hence sovereignty is increasingly removed from nation-states to a new kind of super "stateness" that has neither a central republican body nor the antagonisms of class or national interests resisting the unilateral logic of the market.<sup>4</sup> Driven by a transnational, private, commercial understanding (as opposed to law, which must refer to a social body), this super stateness assumes that it is in the process of producing a global civil society that is a reign of law without the State. Since, however, there is no articulation of inter-individual to central contractuality, the reality is actually quite the opposite: a State without law. In this global state-without-law, the nature of sovereignty in its relation to the movements of the stateless or multitudes follows the logic of the police. Consequently, the systemic struggle between the center and the periphery itself is aligned, or shall we say, complicitous, with the emergence of a super-state, or, quite simply, the identification of Humanity in general with Stateness. While asserting itself time and time again as representative of a particular national will, therefore, the United States super-state assumes the responsibility of global police for protecting all those subjected to the stateness. Indeed, today's wars, launched in the name of Humanity, signal the coming of an age in which the meaning of Humanity itself is starting to gradually coincide with Stateness.

The Gulf War set the precedent for global complicity with the new order of sovereign police, now consolidated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the two figures of modern central order, imperialist and statist, converged. Although the U.N. arrogated to itself the ultimate right of war and legitimate violence, which had formerly exclusively defined the power of each sovereign state, it immediately divested itself of this power by granting the conduct of the war to a private force, that of the United States and its allies; by placing itself beyond jurisdiction, this private force appropriated the power of the police, and thereby constituted itself as a State without law.

Today the top officials of the U.S. federal administration have declared themselves the most authentic representative of Humanity and the embodiment of this ultimate sovereign power. They claim the right to arrogate ultimate lawfulness to the U.S. federal authority. In other words, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate the military that protects and promotes the national interests outside the United States' territory and the police that serve to regulate violence and maintain the state's jurisdiction within its territory. This is to say that the embodiment of lawfulness is in fact beyond any existent law. Therefore these top officials have repeatedly asserted the state of exception, invoked by the state of emergency—which allows the suspension of political rights concerning personal

<sup>3</sup> See Balibar and, for a discussion of the super stateness and class struggle, Bidet 233-306.

<sup>4</sup> Some of the wording and expressions in the first several pages of this essay are from "Proposal for Traces #4" by Jon Solomon and me. I thank Jon Solomon for allowing me to use some expressions from the Proposal in this essay and drawing my attention to Jacques Bidet's argument.

liberty, freedom of expression, informational privacy and so forth—as an indefinite and unending condition under which we must live from this point on. They want to deliberately confuse this condition with juridical rule itself.

In such a situation as, Agamben tells us, was once referred to as the “state of willed exception” (168),<sup>5</sup> and if one is of an “alien origin” and potentially a second class citizen, how can one survive such a condition without committing oneself to that condition voluntarily? This is a question which I could not resist posing to myself and on which I would like to concentrate in this presentation with a view to the general problem of “the *poiesis* of the subject.”

I will read three texts: the first two form a pair, which were published almost simultaneously. These two texts are short stories written in Japanese; *Michi* or Road, appearing in *Bungei Taiwan* (Literary Arts Taiwan), and *Honryû* or Torrent, in *Taiwan Bungaku* (Taiwanese Literature)—both published in July 1943 in the midst of what was customarily referred to as *hijôjitai* or *hijôji* (the state of exception)—by Taiwanese writers, Chin Kasen (Chen Houquan) and Ô Shôyû (Wang Changxiong). The third text is *No-No Boy* by John Okada, a fictional piece about the experience of a Japanese American draft resister, published initially in 1957, more than a decade after the end of the Asia Pacific War.

No doubt, what I am going to present is a comparative project. Yet, it is necessary to issue a disclaimer at the outset. My comparison is guided by the analysis of schematism in the regime of translation,<sup>6</sup> according to which the representation of the comparable unities between which a comparison is conducted is posterior to the act of translation. Translation is often represented as a transfer of “something” from one language unity to another, between two organic unities of languages which are supposedly not implicated in one another. But, it is important to note that comparison cannot be reduced to one between the presumed unities of two organic entities or—in this case—two societies postulated as organic unities. Above all, it is a matter of how comparison is represented, a matter of an assumed scheme which is rendered self-evident as a consequence of the repeated use of such a representation. What I want to presage here is that my reading of these texts will not conform to this scheme or view them as representing in one manner or another the societies in which they were produced. Undoubtedly it is necessary to refer to the specific social and historical conditions which enable us to make sense out of these texts; the historical and social specificities of the texts cannot be overlooked. Yet, comparison is not regulated to produce some judgment about similarities or differences between Japanese society—or the Taiwanese/Chinese society—of the early 1940s and the American

<sup>5</sup> Agamben writes, “The state of exception thus ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of factual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself (emphasis in original). National Socialist jurists were so aware of the particularity of the situation that they defined it by the paradoxical expression ‘state of willed exception’ (*einen gewollten Ausnahmestand*). ‘Through the suspension of fundamental rights,’ writes Werner Spohr, a jurist close to the regime, ‘the decree brings into being a state of willed exception for the sake of the establishment of the National Socialist State.’” Spohr is quoted in Agamben from Drobisch and Wieland 28.

<sup>6</sup> For a more detailed exposition of schematism in the regime of translation, see Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity* 51-63.

society of the 1950s. I refuse to equate the historical and social specificity of a text to the subsumption of it under the generalized organicity which is more often than not superimposed upon the putative spatio-temporal unity of a nation-state. Accordingly, whereas I do not deny these were produced in the particular loci marked by the specificities of place and time, I do not regard either *Michi* or *Honryû* primarily as expressions of the "Japanese reality" or *No-No Boy* as an expression of the "American reality." These texts will be read under a comparative directive towards an uncovering of the general technology of the Imperial Nationalism, a technology by means of which a subject of the Imperial Nation is manufactured out of so-called minority individuals.

## I

In the first half of the twentieth century many of the industrialized nations underwent some transformation in response to the sense of crisis in capitalism. The United States and Japan were no exception. Although chronologically and geopolitically the nationalisms of the two countries should be approached from different viewpoints and in separate historical contexts, they have much in common when we examine them from the perspective of imperial nationalism. My inquiry, therefore, adopts the formula of Comparative Imperial Nationalism. (I hope that this essay will eventually be couched in a larger treatise on the formation of imperial nationalism.) Since I have neither time nor space to talk about the other aspects of imperial nationalism, I would like to focus on the problem of the manufacture of the subject or, to use a philosophical idiom of the 1930s, "the *poiesis* of the subject," with a view to the minorities, those people of "alien origins" who could be stripped of their citizenship and fundamental political rights pre-emptively in imperial nationalisms.

In considering how histories of East Asia prior to the end of the Asian-Pacific War had been remembered and written about in the post-war period, we cannot overlook two moments: the collapse of the Japanese Empire and the colonization of Japan by the United States. Generally speaking, as far as countries under the U.S. postwar domination are concerned, histories of East Asia have been written in large measure for the sake of legitimating the American military and political reign in the Asia Pacific region. Let us not forget that the histories were also filed to absolve Japanese Imperialism. As became glaringly obvious at the International Tribunal on War Crimes against Women in Tokyo in December, 2000, the absolution of Japanese colonial and war responsibilities constituted an essential component of American hegemony. Deliberately avoided in those histories, which apparently celebrate Japan's defeat and the democratic objectives behind U.S. policies and strategies, were questions indispensable to peoples who had suffered from the multi-layered imposition of colonial domination and violence: How could colonial rule damage the colonized physically as well as psychologically? How did colonialism give rise to not only national liberation movements but also racial hierarchy? Why does nationalism exist in complicity with racism? What measures have to be taken in order to liberate the ex-colonized from colonial legacies? In addition, those histories were designed to obfuscate and

disperse the issues of colonial and war responsibilities of the institutions, colonial administrators, military personnel and cultures which required and propagated colonial violence and oppression.

These histories were not promoted by the conservative historians of the United States alone. Japanese historians and intellectuals were also instrumental in their invention, propagation and endorsement. Unlike previous colonial rules, the American occupation administration did not rebuff Japanese nationalism; rather it put up anti-colonial banners and pretended to take sides with national liberation causes; it protected and even nurtured Japanese ethnic exceptionalism. Japanese intellectuals, who could hardly endorse the military and political policies of the United States towards East Asia, were exonerated from the task of investigating the mutually reinforcing relationship between their nationalistic sentiment, which propelled their anti-Americanism emotively, and American hegemony.<sup>7</sup> It is in the disavowal of the two countries' colonial pasts that the Japanese and U.S. nationalisms were in complicity with one another, as if intimating today's complicitous mutuality of the center and the periphery under the domination of the global super-state. Furthermore despite extremely violent encounters and interactions among many different ethnic, racial, gender and national groups, the past was narrated only within the framework of national history, so that neither American nor Japanese historians dared to undertake the elementary examination of comparing the two imperial nationalisms in the same analytical field using the same set of criteria. Therefore, Japanese society and its colonial strategies in the 1930s and early 1940s were frequently objects of denunciation but scarcely studied in detail for fear that the results of such a study would reflect on America's home problems. From the outset, Japanese nationalism was by definition assumed to be an exceptionalist, ethnic particularism exclusive of other ethnicities, while American nationalism always manifests itself in its universalistic orientation toward multiethnic integration. Perhaps this is a case of collective transference as it is brilliantly allegorized in the film *M. Butterfly*.<sup>8</sup>

It is a most common feature of the imperialist complex to justify the imperialism of one's own country by insisting on its exceptional traits and superiority to other imperialisms. Every nationalism, imperial nationalism in particular, presents itself as an exception. Exceptionalism is inherent in any imperial nationalism. But we cannot succumb to the temptation of exceptionalism, regardless of whether its claim is clothed in the uniqueness of an ethnicity, of the West, or of some religious tradition. This is why a comparative analysis of imperial nationalisms, together with an appropriate analysis of the psychic mechanism of denial of colonial guilt, is indispensable in view of our urgent need to find the ways to deal with the reality, in the progressive present, of a new imperialism and its effects.

<sup>7</sup> The recent emotional response of the Japanese public to the disclosure of the North Korean kidnapping cases, which was initially provoked by the rightist newspapers in September and October 2002, is a good testimony to the complicity of American hegemony and Japanese nationalism.

<sup>8</sup> See Chow.

In the early 1940s, systematic campaigns to mobilize local students and youths to join the military were under way, not only in Japan proper but also in the annexed territories of the Japanese Empire such as Taiwan and Korea.<sup>9</sup> Undoubtedly these were a response to the chronic shortage of labor in Japan, which also gave rise to a variety of social measures including the lifelong employment system, the higher social status of women and the forced relocation of laborers from the annexed territories to industrial centers in Japan proper and other parts of the Empire. Just as the civil rights movement on the United States mainland could not be separated from the war going on in Indochina during the 1960s and early 1970s, integration policies—generally referred to as “*kômin-ka seisaku*”<sup>10</sup>—and the integration of minorities into the nation were closely connected to the prolonged war in China.

Perhaps, the most salient feature of governmental rhetoric can be found in its emphasis on voluntarism: the local recruits in Taiwan ‘the *hontôjin*’—*bendaoren* in Beijinhua—(the islanders as opposed to ‘the *naichijin*’—*neidiren*—the Japanese from Japan proper) were supposed to have decided of their own free will to join the Imperial Forces, and to have found an anticipatory resolution to their own deaths as Japanese subjects loyal to the Emperor. Publicly propagated was the fantastic scenario that these islanders wanted to be “Japanese” and, therefore, volunteered to die as “Japanese.” It is important to note that the islanders’ voluntarism was premised upon their subjectivity: their anticipatory resolution to their own deaths for the country was appealed to as a testimony to the fact that they were just as capable of patriotic actions as the Japanese from Japan proper; that they were as authentically “Japanese” as the *naichijin* in respect to their subjectivity.

Citing passages from Miyata Setsuko’s *Chôsen minshû to kôminka-seisaku* (The Korean masses and imperialization policies), Komagome Takeshi refers to some cases concerning the imperialization policies in Korea. He notes that the Korean youth often boasted of “their being Japanese” in the 1930s and early 1940s (223). While the Governor-General’s Office and the Japanese Army in Korea worked hard to manufacture loyal imperial subjects of the colonized population, Miyata and Komagome both argue, they implemented a number of social reforms but never in the direction of abolishing the existent institutionalized forms of discrimination. Yet, some Koreans wished to go beyond the existing discriminatory barriers by becoming “more Japanese than the Japanese proper themselves,” says Komagome (224). There was no way to conceal the obvious contradiction between what the rhetoric of national integration and imperialization claimed and the reality of institutional discrimination against the Korean population. “It would be an impossible demand: you ought to behave as loyal subjects of the emperor even though you must be aware you can never be the Japanese” (231).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Higuchi and Kang.

<sup>10</sup> A number of policies were implemented in order to assimilate the population in the annexed territories into the Japanese nation in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The banning of the use of local languages in mass media and on public occasions in Korea and Taiwan, and *Sôshi Kaimei* (the Creation of Modern Family and the Change of Family Names) are well known as such policies. Cf. Miyata.

But, precisely because of this contradiction inherent in the colonial reign, it was necessary to invent a technology whereby the contradiction could be mediated for the manufacture of the subject; what was at issue was how to render it as a productive moment in the *poiesis* of the imperial subject. Such a desire for Japanese identity would otherwise be blocked in the subject because of the contradiction inherent in the colonial reign, yet in fantasy it could be fulfilled. This is why the management of fantasy was absolutely essential in the *kôminka-seisaku* (imperialization policies) because, in certain fantastic works, colonial discrimination could be appealed to so as to produce an insatiable desire for Japanese identity in the colonized. Thus the contradiction could be internalized in the colonized as the source which propels the colonized towards Japanese identity.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly we regard literature in Japanese in colonial Taiwan as a technology for the *poiesis* of the subject.

Nevertheless, let us not overlook the fact that the setting of a fantastic staging as the background to the discriminatory distinction of the islanders (*hontôjin*) and the Japanese proper (*naichijin*) was sublated into the indiscriminate "Japanese." This scenario was played out effectively only insofar as a certain division of fantastic labor was assumed: it was to be staged with the islander as an actor and the Japanese proper as the audience. The islander was expected to act before and for the audience from Japan proper. However, it is not the islander but the Japanese from Japan proper that were the protagonists in this fantasy.

During the period of *kôminka-seisaku*, Taiwanese novelists wrote some short stories about volunteer soldiers such as *Shiganhei* (*The Volunteer Soldier*) by Shû Kinba (Chou Jingbo), *Michi* (*Road*) by Chin Kasen (Chen Huoquan) and *Honryû* or *Torrent* by Ô Shôyû (Wang Changxiong). It is to be noted that the editors of a literary journal *Bungei Taiwan* (Literary Arts Taiwan), who were Japanese from Japan proper,<sup>12</sup> commented upon *Road*, a short story depicting the anguish an islander intellectual experiences in the process of reaching a decision to join the military service. One of them wrote, "Some critics might say that this is not sophisticated enough as a piece of literature, but I would ignore such an evaluation. Has there ever been as powerful and honest a work describing a whole-hearted enthusiasm for becoming Japanese? Has one ever talked so excruciatingly about the anxiety involved in becoming Japanese? Has the human struggle with this anxiety ever received so forceful an expression as this? This road is the Road to Japan" (Hamada 142). Another said, "Up to half-way in the

<sup>11</sup> This is exactly the state of affairs which Leo Ching pointed out in "Give Me Japan and Nothing Else! Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism": "Unlike *dôka* [assimilation], which remained an unrealizable ideal of colonial integration, *kôminka* necessitated an objectification of Japanization by demanding the colonized to act, live, and die for the emperor in defending the Japanese Empire. What *kôminka* entailed for the colonized, then, as exemplified in the subject construction of a good and loyal Japanese and the so-called *kômin* literature, is the interiorization of an objective colonial antagonism into a subjective struggle within, not between, colonial identities. In other words, cultural representations under *kôminka* displaced the concrete problematic of the social and replaced it with the ontology of the personal" (780).

<sup>12</sup> The editors of *Literary Arts Taiwan* were Hamada Hayao and Nishikawa Mitsuru. Nishikawa was born in a Japanese family from Japan proper, but he grew up in Taiwan.

script, I was not really convinced. It was a bit rough. There were many incorrect uses of particles. But, as I reached the latter half, I felt my eyes watering. I thought this was a great piece of literature, and I could not help sitting up straight. I wished every one could read this work. I read it aloud. And each time I read it aloud, I found myself moved without any pretence" (Nishikawa 142).

In respect to their literary technique and linguistic competency, islander writers were considered inferior to writers from Japan proper, but, in their patriotic ardor, the journal's editors insisted that they can surpass the Japanese proper. On the one hand, according to this logic, the Japanese from Japan proper are vastly superior to the islanders with regard to their industrial development and degree of civilization, so that their civilizing positionality remains unwavering. On the other hand, they have to learn from the islanders about the virtues of honesty and sincerity which they used to have but have now lost. The *naichijin* overwhelm the *hontôjin* with their economic and political superiority. But the *hontôjin* are more authentically "Japanese" in respect to their patriotic ardor than the *naichijin*. Summarily, this is the lesson which the editors of *Literary Arts Taiwan* wanted to discover in Chin Kasen's autobiographical novel *Road*. What was wished for in this fantastic staging is that the islanders themselves should confess the desire, the fulfillment of which the Japanese from Japan proper wished the islanders to achieve. Basically what the editors recognized in *Road* was the scenario that the Taiwanese misrecognized the desire of the *naichijin* editors as their own and thereby wanted to be "Japanese" by acting out the role expected of them by the *naichijin*.

In *Road*, the *hontôjin* intellectual, whose pen name is Sei Nan (Qing Nan),<sup>13</sup> works as an engineer in a national camphor refinery factory in Taiwan and is expected to be promoted to the rank of full engineer, but his wishes are dashed because of the ethnic glass ceiling within the company. The protagonist who is personally committed to the principle of equality in the Japanese nation is portrayed as follows:

*He regarded himself as a proper Japanese. He disliked not only the word naichijin, but also its opposite hontôjin. The texture of these words, and their connotations made him feel ill at ease. He believed it foolish to regard oneself either as naichijin or as hontôjin. In the first place, the self-depreciating attitude of regarding oneself as the hontôjin was repulsive to him. He wanted to believe that he was simply a good Japanese. He did not want this belief to be called into question. He should not be forced to doubt what he wants to believe, and people must let him hold on to that belief [which should protect him from envy and self-depreciation]. It would be, he thought, stupid to cause a tragic incident out of a sense of envy or self-depreciation.*  
(110)

Obviously, to be Japanese does not mean to be the *naichijin* here. Taiwanese islanders are equally as Japanese as those from Japan proper, and to claim to be

<sup>13</sup> Taiwanese names are Romanized according to the standard pronunciation of 1957. When necessary, Japanese pronunciation is added. Due to my ignorance, I cannot Romanize Chinese characters in phonetics other than that of Beijinghua.

Japanese is to obtain the rights to overcome the various forms of discrimination which distinguish the *hontôjin* from the *naichijin*. Nonetheless, Japanese nationality is not an abstract quality totally free of the past. The narrator of the novel acknowledges the weight of tradition:

*The Japanese return to their authenticity when they are aware of "the tradition of their blood." By this I do not mean that one is Japanese because one has inherited Japanese blood. What I mean to say is that the Japanese are to grow up receiving the tradition of the Japanese Spirit from their childhood so that they may be able to manifest that spirit if necessary. Precisely because of this capacity, one is Japanese.*  
(118)

Certainly, "to be a good Japanese" is not a property monopolized by the Japanese from Japan proper but, Sei Nan admits, it is necessary for the islanders to emulate the *naichijin* as the ideal in order to be a good Japanese. Therefore, among "the *hontôjin*, the Koreans, and the Manchu," there should be many who are equipped with the Japanese Spirit. They "hold on to the Japanese Spirit firmly" (117), yet, as it is not innate in them, they must learn it from those who have grown up with it.

Thus, the scenario outlined in *Road* accommodated two contradictory demands at the same time. On the one hand, the Japanese from Japan proper were inherently superior to the islanders. On the other, as Japanese, they were equal, regardless of their ethnicity. A similar scenario, which fulfils the wishes of one group to be recognized as superior to the other in the midst of the rhetoric of equality, might be found in humanistic ideology in general. And no doubt it is this humanistic scenario that moved the editors of *Literary Arts Taiwan* to tears.

It goes without saying that the celebration of the Japanese Spirit in *Road* cannot immediately be taken to be the expression of the author's conviction. Literary production was apparently conceived of as an essential part of the Total War Mobilization, and the marks of censorship and integration policies are evident in this work too. As the traces of censored characters indicates, this piece was published only after the approval of governmental censors. However, this does not mean that the Japanese-language literature by the *hontôjin* writers can be viewed merely as a consequence of their collaboration with the Japanese colonial authority. For, as in *Road*, we now can recognize the features of an imaginary relationship between the individuals and the state there, and this imaginary relationship between the minority individuals under colonial rule and the state was the very theme which the State logic of integration, whose most elaborate expression can be found in the "Logic of the Species",<sup>14</sup> pursued as its problematic. In other words, a reading of this literature might well illustrate to us how the multi-ethnic State's logic of integration could weave the desires of minority intellectuals and persuade them towards the policies of the empire.

Throughout *Road*, however, although speaking the Japanese language and behaving like those Japanese from Japan proper was not thematically problematized, the multilingual nature of Taiwanese society was hinted at here and there.

<sup>14</sup> For a more detailed reading of the "Logic of the Species," see Sakai, "Subject and Substratum."

It is presumed as if a Taiwanese intellectual could transform himself and thereby modernize his environment by speaking Japanese and behaving like those from Japan proper.

For those who could not easily convince themselves of their Japanese nationality, the concern for national belonging inevitably oscillated between two polarities: the facticity of their immediate ethnic origin and the belonging to a national community through their commitment to ideas. Accordingly, Sei Nan is portrayed as a protagonist who tries to go beyond his fixation with ethnic origin in order to belong to the nation through his commitment to ideas. This must have been exemplary behavior among well-educated local intellectuals in Taiwan then, but, at the same time, as Chen Wanyi observed about the ambiguous relationship between the Japanese nation and the elite *hontôjin*, like Lee Denghui, returning from the large cities in Japan proper, the story of Sei Nan seems to vividly illustrate the ideological setting of national belonging for minorities.

Since he is not from Japan proper, Sei Nan is denied promotion to the rank of full engineer at the factory. He is betrayed by the very Japanese Spirit in whose universalism he has invested so much, and, as a result, he is now caught in a self-destructive neurosis. He was flatly told that he did not belong in the Japanese nation. While censorship was exercised to prevent the negative images of those from Japan proper from spreading widely in the colonies, yet how could such a description of *naichijin*'s outright hypocrisy be allowed? The colonial authority could not disallow the symbolic expression of colonial violence precisely because literary production was a technology for the *poiesis* of the subject, a technology by which to manufacture the colonized into a subject who would identify with the Japanese nation. It was meant to produce an effective scenario in which, in fantasy, the colonized would overcome many obstacles imposed by the reality of colonialism to evolve into a fully fledged Japanese. Only through a vivid description of these obstacles—*naichijin*'s discriminatory attitude, their haughtiness, *hontôjin*'s backwardness and sense of inferiority, legal discrimination and so forth—could *hontôjin* characters such as Sei Nan serve as the point of attachment for the colonized. Otherwise, the story would never succeed in offering the sense of reality against which background the colonized could recognize the protagonist as an embodiment of *their own* fantasy. Engaging in the integration strategy of *kôminka*, the colonial authority could not afford to remove the description of harsh colonial reality from Japanese language literature.

Just as the humiliation of the colonized is directly represented in the sexually impotent figure of Ayuh in Chô Bunkan (Zhâng Wenhuan)'s "*Iyatumu ge*," Sei Nan's breakdown is no doubt a trope for the Taiwanese humiliation throughout the colonial reign. In due course, his self-respect which was premised so much upon his membership to the nation is fatally crushed. Then he is forced to learn that, while promoting the ideal of the Japanese nation beyond ethnic particularity, the Japanese from Japan proper do not believe in it at all. Evoking the sense of guilt in the *naichijin* readership, the depiction of his anguish may well turn his patriotism into rebellion; Chin Kasen's narration seems to lead the reader to a fantasized argument that Sei Nan loves the country so much that, as a proper Japanese, he is fully entitled to denounce injustice in Japanese society and protest

against the colonial administration. Implicitly it discloses the fundamental hypocrisy of the integrationist rhetoric of an imperial nationalism and the miserable situation of minorities in which, in the final analysis, they can only demand their own recognition from the nation as a whole, seeking love from the pastoral power, just as a lost sheep begs for the merciful gaze of a shepherd. Let us recall that, from the establishment of the modern state at the beginning of the Meiji period until the loss of the empire in August 1945, the emotive sense of Japanese nationality was often displayed in the imperial slogan, *Isshi Dôjin*—which implies “since everyone in the nation is embraced in the gaze of the Emperor, he never ceases to care about you.”<sup>15</sup>

In spite of the universalistic rhetoric of integration, what confronts Sei Nan is the reality of Japanese proprietarism, of a *naichi shugi* that the Japanese nation consists solely of Japanese from Japan proper. Yet, it is misleading to argue that the rhetoric of imperial nationalism such as the Logic of the Species primarily serves to disguise the presence of ethnic and racial discrimination within the empire. Since, perhaps more importantly, it was a response to colonial anxiety and had to be invented in order to prevent the mutiny of minorities. It was a reaction to social antagonism which racial and ethnic discrimination could provoke. The empire had to displace potential civil strife by appealing to the logic of national integration.

Realizing that the glass ceiling which prevented his promotion to the rank of full engineer could neither be removed nor publicly criticized, Sei Nan decides to volunteer for military service. He makes an anticipatory resolution to his own death only when he has seen that the universalistic rhetoric of national integration has unambiguously failed him. For, he believes that the only way to recover his self-respect is to renegotiate his belonging to the nation, which, for the Taiwanese at that time, meant embracing the State’s call for self-sacrifice and, implicitly, Japanese supremacy. But, as Avishai Margalit tells us, self-respect is not self-esteem.

Instead of appealing to the option of rebellion, however, Sei Nan chooses to postulate his enemy not inside the empire but outside it. His real antagonism is displaced by an external and fantastic one between Japan and its external enemy. Among the works of Japanese literature by the islander writers, *Road* by Chin Kasen is said to be one of the most accommodating with regard to the *kôminka* or imperialization policies. Yet, even *Road* does not fail to interrogate the pertinence of such patriotic altercations as “we must act to make the state accord with the Way of God, and thereby prevent the state from deviating from truth and justice” and “we are called upon to destroy deception, untruthfulness, and injustice within the state because these drive the nation to be alienated from the state and give rise to a separation between the nation and the state” (Tanabe 261). Chin Kasen shows us implicitly that when one is not allowed to “destroy deception, untruthfulness, and injustice within the state,” the Taiwanese islander volunteers to be “a Japanese soldier” not because of his freedom but rather because of coercion or desperation.

<sup>15</sup> For a more detailed account of *Isshi Dôjin* and the modern state formation, see Hirota.

What is outlined in *Road* is a fantastic mechanism in which the domestic colonial violence against minorities within the nation is displaced onto the aggressivity of nationalism and externalized into military violence against the enemy of the nation as a whole. Therefore, it is not because the rhetoric of national integration failed to actualize equality beyond ethnic and racial differences that we must denounce imperial nationalism as exemplified in the Logic of the Species. Rather it is because those humiliated minorities regain their honor and self-esteem by displacing and externalizing the aggressivity of the nation as a whole onto outside victims. The rhetoric of national integration thereby succeeds in integrating minorities without actualizing equality for them or allowing them to fully regain not only their self-esteem that could only be granted through recognition by their victimizers, but also their self-respect that endows the victims with an agency capable of extending solidarity to the oppressed of another place and ethnicity. What must be called into question is the technology of national subjectivity in which one's belonging to the nation can be guaranteed through one's anticipatory resolution to one's own death, through one's voluntary will to die for the country.

It is in this historical connection that we might appraise the political significance of O Shōyu's *Honryū* or *Torrent*. For *Road* and *Torrent* seem to have engaged in a severe struggle with one another, indicating different ways for minority intellectuals under Japanese colonial rule to act in response to the State's call for their voluntarism.

Whereas *Road* was written as a narrative depicting the protagonist Sei Nan's anguish and his internal monologue, O Shōyu succeeded in giving expression to the fears and contradictions which an intellectual had to live through under colonial rule in the form of three main characters and in terms of their conflicts with each other. The three characters are the narrator, seemingly a Taiwanese medical doctor who has lived in Tokyo for a long time in the past to receive his university education and then returned to Taiwan to inherit his father's clinic; Itō Haruo or Zhu Chunsheng, a high school teacher of Japanese literature; and Itō's nephew, Lin Hakunen (Lin Bainien), who studies at the high school where Itō teaches. Itō Haruo is portrayed as a native intellectual who is most successful in modernizing himself, receiving a Japanese education, speaking impeccable Japanese, and working tirelessly to build the Japanese Spirit among native Taiwanese children. While the narrator remains unbelievably loyal to the propagandistic stereotyping of Japanese culture and the *naichijin*, or the Japanese from Japan proper, by the colonial authority, O Shōyu did not forget to include a few remarks indicating the oddity of Itō's presence. In the narrator's second encounter with Itō, a peculiar exchange of words happens:

*"Welcome to our house" said my [the narrator's] mother in the national language [Japanese]. She continued, but this time in the Taiwanese language [hontōgo], "The rainy season has just arrived. It is unpleasant, isn't it?"*

*"This is my mother. She only speaks a little bit of the national language." I introduced my mother to Itō.*

*Then, he responded, "This is your mother. How do you do? I am Itô Haruo. Thank you for your welcome," in the national language. I was struck by the sense of oddity. Itô would not speak Taiwanese, even on such an occasion. Instantaneously I was overwhelmed by the feeling that Itô's philosophy of life was extreme and excessively unyielding. I could not help translating his words for my mother. (224)*

What is remarkable about this story is the fact that, having chosen Japanese literature over his medical career, Itô Haruo is not depicted as a typical seeker of upward mobility who would collaborate with the colonial authority simply in order to acquire whatever economic and political gain that might trickle down from the colonial governmental structure. He is married to a woman from Japan proper, and attempts to totally render every aspect of his life as Japanese. Beyond his personal life, he believes that the entire native population in Taiwan must be fundamentally Japanized; consequently he devotes himself to the task of educating the younger generation among the Taiwanese. Most hostile to this character is his nephew, Lin Hakunen, who sees in Itô the very betrayal of the Taiwanese native community. He cannot forgive Itô Haruo for being ashamed of his native language, his own family and, particularly, his mother in whose figure his ethnic identity is symbolically represented.

What intense animosity between Itô and his nephew invariably discloses is a competition between the two contrasting visions of modernization. The one which unproblematically endorsed the figure of Itô authorizes the historical scheme of the colonial civilizing mission by which the cultural quality associated with the colonizing power is immediately equated to a sign of progress, a defeat of the primitive, and the transformation of the uncivilized. The social reality of Taiwan is constantly viewed as essentially primitive, and as that which must be radically transformed. But, in this viewing of the primitive, the chronological order of modernization is invariably identified with the colonial order of a civilizing mission. Consequently the time of modernization is totally usurped by the dichotomy of the colonizer=developed and the colonized=underdeveloped. As a result, civilizing time is, expected to run from the developed to the underdeveloped. There are many who uphold this scheme in both the colonizing and the colonized societies, and Itô Haruo is typically a fictional native character whose entire existence confirms the historical scheme of the colonial civilizing mission from the viewpoint of the colonized. As Japan too has been modernized in this manner, Itô is a generalizable figure who could be found anywhere in the empire, either in Japan proper or the annexed territories.

Lin Hakunen, Itô's nephew, offers a different vision of modernization. The trope of the native mother plays an exceptionally important role here just as in many contemporary Japanese novels centering around the theme of *tenkô*, the leftist's conversion to nationalism under state oppression. In a letter Lin writes to the narrator from Tokyo where he has decided to pursue his college education, Itô's nephew insists against his uncle's modernization scheme,

*But, it is my belief that, the more authentic a Japanese I become, the more self-confident a Taiwanese I should be. I have no need to be ashamed of my origin*

*though I was indisputably born in the south seas. As I get familiar with the everyday life here [in a metropolis in Japan], I do not necessarily look down upon the provincial styles of my home country. However embarrassing my native mother may appear, I cannot deny my affection for her. (247)*

In the process of modernization, according to this vision, local social formation must be transformed, but it does not necessarily mean that the reality of a local site such as the old port town of Tanshui—which is implicitly referred to in *Torrent*—must be made identical with that of a metropolis in Japan. The cultural quality of Japaneseness cannot unilaterally be determined by the Japanese from Japan proper. Rather than the pre-determined archetype of the past, the Japaneseness of Japanese nationality must suggest this indeterminacy of the future in the subject formation, an open-endedness which allows every ethnic group in the empire to participate in the process of their self-fashioning and self-transformation. Undoubtedly the integrationist logic of the State such as the “Logic of the Species” is a response to the logic of *minzokushugi*, ethnic nationalism, symbolically represented in the figure of Lin Hakunen. The imperial nation can not survive unless it has a persuasive logic with which to undermine the political legitimacy of ethnic nationalism. The “Logic of the Species” is such an attempt, but it also tries to appropriate the issues of ethnicity and cultural differences for the constitution of the imperial nation.

The Taiwanese intellectuals’ authentic Japanese nationality, which was to be endorsed by their patriotism, was supposedly to serve as a warranty that they were fully qualified to criticize the discriminatory attitudes of the Japanese from Japan proper against the islanders and other minorities, and to destroy the various forms of injustice in the nation state of Japan, so as to transform the given social formation. As Tanabe Hajime conceptualized in philosophic terms, Japanese nationality should transcend ethnicity and racial differences because one’s ethnic and racial identity come into being only within the movement of transcending such an identity toward the actualization of the national community premised upon universal values. Ethnicity and race do not exist in and of themselves. They are not fully objective categories; they remain indeterminate unless they are determined subjectively. They are always moments of the *mediation* of and in the subject. The subject is this agent of self-transformation or self-fashioning, but because it transforms and changes itself, it exists only in self-differentiation and in the ecstatic movement of becoming other than oneself.

Therefore, Tanabe introduced the differentiation of subject and substratum, according to which the subject gives rise to or discloses its substratum as the original environment of its self which is being transformed in the formation of the subject. A person, who was born and brought up in Taiwan, faces his ethnic background and manages to assert his identity of ethnic Taiwanese as “his substratum.” But he can assert his ethnicity only insofar as he is a modern subject who continually refashions himself anew, and reconstitutes himself as a “subject” overcoming “his substratum.” Being of an ethnic origin is no hindrance to being “modern.” His term “subject” meant the individual agent who participates in the active transformation of social reality in which the subject’s old self was

nurtured. In this sense the figure of Lin Bainien exemplifies those to whom the introduction of a universalistic rhetoric like the "Logic of the Species" was a response. In order to mobilize a large population of varying ethnic and historical backgrounds, it was absolutely necessary for the Japanese State to invent the philosophy of the multi-ethnic empire that could weave the desires of minority intellectuals and persuade them towards the policies of the empire.

Although the islanders may be less Japanese in terms of the substratum, they are fully "Japanese" as subjects in their freedom to choose to be "Japanese," to live and die according to the universal laws of the Japanese state. The scenario which had been outlined in theoretical vocabulary in the "Logic of the Species" was now used repeatedly. Of course, I am not arguing that the texts of the "Logic of the Species" were cited verbatim by the governmental agencies in their propaganda.<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, one can see how the "Logic of the Species" could endow the intellectuals of minority backgrounds with very elaborate meanings and interpretations for the anxiety and suffering which they had to undergo under colonial conditions, and encourage them into a particular direction of historical action.

## II

Now I would like to move onto the third text, *No-No Boy*, written mainly in English and published in 1957, twelve years after the end of the Asia Pacific and Second World War.

Since it was written and published after the war, it evaded wartime censorship. In addition to the many historical and social conditions which demand our attention in reading *No-No Boy* together with *Road* and *Torrent*, we can discern a number of underlying problematics which all three texts address:

1. The ambivalent and unstable relationship between the narrator and his language of writing. Perhaps this is an attribute shared by all three texts, which allows me to treat them as works by those of "alien origins."
2. National belonging and the fear of losing nationality. How and whether one belongs to a national community presented itself primarily as an anxiety-invoking query. All these texts were written to deal with this anxiety.
3. All three refer to the historical conditions of the state of exception or *hijô jitai* in the early 1940s when minority populations were systematically mobilized in the total war in both the Japanese Empire and the United States.
4. Although this point was not explicitly spelled out in the cases of *Road* and *Torrent*, the voluntary soldiers were potentially recruited to fight against the

<sup>16</sup> In a small number of cases, it is possible to argue that the governmental announcements and ordinances included direct references to the Logic of the Species. As one of the examples, see *Daitôa Kensetsu-ron* [On the construction of the Greater East Asia], prepared by the Planning Agency and published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

enemy who could well include people ethnically similar or even familiarly related to the soldiers themselves.<sup>17</sup> Voluntarism was a choice forced upon minority individuals between the two contrasting forms of collective identification: nationality or kinship.

As in *Road* and *Torrent*, what is pursued throughout *No-No Boy* is the omnipresence of the State in the life of the protagonist, Ichiro. Yet, at issue is not whether or not some substantive authority called the State, objectively, exists to regulate every aspect of life for the entire civil population. Instead, its omnipresence is meant to draw attention, above all else, to the fact that the novel's narrative is organized from such a particular point of view that, as soon as any word is uttered, every character in this novel inevitably has to engage in some dialogue with the State: when every character's utterance is already an implicit address to the State, then the State must be present everywhere in the imaginary space of this novel. This is what is meant by the omnipresence of the State.

Born in the United States and brought up by first-generation Japanese parents, the protagonist Ichiro was transferred along with his family to a concentration camp. After two years there, he and other American Japanese male prisoners of the appropriate age were drafted for military service. But Ichiro refused to volunteer to serve in the United States military. Consequently he was sentenced to imprisonment and had to spend two years as a convict.

A draft resister is a criminal, that is, one who has committed a crime against the State. Since, in modern societies, crime is primarily defined as a transgression of the State's law, draft resistance constitutes a criminal offence against the State just like tax evasion, extortion and drunk driving. Unlike other criminal acts, however, to refuse the State's call for military service is a felony of exceptional gravity. It is not only a violation of the State's law but also an infringement of the very emotive bond tying the State with the totality of the national community.

Readers are expected to gradually reconstruct his story from fragments of memories about Ichiro's past and to shape a background against which Ichiro's anecdotes are narrated. Like a hidden center of gravity, his draft resistance overshadows every aspect of his life and, in due course, predetermines the horizon of these anecdotes. In other words, in this novel, the reality of his "draft resistance" works as a general atmosphere within which the narration must proceed.

After serving two years in prison, Ichiro comes home to Seattle where his parents now live. He returns from the punishment for his act of saying "no," and also from a specific history which is irredeemably engraved in the lives of his family. Yet, unlike many soldiers coming home from war, Ichiro cannot expect to return to his normal life, for the past is for him something he cannot pay for in only two years. It may even appear that Ichiro does not believe he has paid for his crime. Ichiro's struggle is presented *as though* it were a tormenting process of personal redemption and search for forgiveness. So the narrator refers to the pointless resistance of Freddie Akimoto, Ichiro's friend who also refused military draft:

<sup>17</sup> Some Taiwanese soldiers of the Japanese Army actually defected and crossed over to the Chinese Red army. Cf. Chen Yingzhen.

*Freddie was waging a shallow struggle with a to-hell-with-the-rest-of-the-world attitude, and he wasn't being very successful. One could not fight an enemy who looked upon him as much as to say: "This is America, which is for Americans. You have spent two years in prison to prove that you are Japanese—go to Japan!" (51)*

The narrator continues,

*Was it possible that he and Freddie and the other four of the poker crowd and all the other American-born, American-educated Japanese who had renounced their American-ness in a frightening moment of madness had done so irretrievably? Was there no hope of redemption? Surely there must be. He was still a citizen. He could still vote. He was free to travel and work and study and marry and drink and gamble. People forgot and, in forgetting, forgave. (51)*

In these passages where the narrative voice oscillates between the narrator and Ichiro, this allusion to Ichiro's and the other draft resisters' past act as a crime and their hope for redemption cannot be sufficiently comprehended as either a description of their situation nor as an analysis of their inner strife. Here, the narration itself is a speech act which we may call "confession."

Confession presumes a specific power relationship between the addresser and the addressee. The addresser refers to himself, thereby erecting a boundary between his interiority, to which the others have no access, and his exterior which is exposed to the scrutiny of others. In this instance, it is not necessary for us to preempt the interiority of the addresser prior to the performance of confession. What is at stake is that the interiority of the addresser enters the scene as a correlate of the addressee. The addressee is posited by the addresser as a special persona only to whom his interiority—which would not be unveiled to others—is disclosed and in whom his wish for redemption is invested. In confession the *penitent* discloses his or her secret, yet confession is not a general disclosure of some secret; it must be *addressed* to this special person or one who occupies the position of the *confessor*: the addresser must solicit the attention of this person by unveiling what cannot be seen by others. In addition, there must be asymmetry between the addresser and the addressee, for, while one is urged to disclose his interiority, the other is exempt from risking such disclosure.

It may appear that the narrator of *No-No Boy* wants to assign Ichiro to the position of the *penitent* in confession. When Ichiro is made to occupy this position, you as a reader of this narration would then be solicited to occupy the position of the *confessor*. You would be listening to Ichiro, and in this narrative configuration you would be expected to play the role of one who is capable of forgiving his sin.

Here it is necessary to bear in mind that the crime Ichiro committed was neither injury nor larceny but draft resistance. Judicially speaking, injury and larceny are both crimes against the State, but in these criminal categories it is possible to identify particular victims. And it is from these victims that the criminal must solicit forgiveness in the first place. The intelligibility of the term "forgiving" depends upon whom one can identify as authorized to forgive, and

in the cases of injury and larceny we tend to assume no serious dispute about the identity or identifiability of the one to whom debt in some form must be paid back.

However, in the case of draft resistance, from whom can a criminal expect forgiveness? By refusing the State's call for military service, whom did Ichiro offend in the first place? One cannot find any particular victim for his felony. Or the victim from whom he has to obtain redemption is the very notion of the People of the United States of America as a whole, which the State is supposed to represent.

If what is deployed in *No-No Boy* is nothing but the performance of confession, with Ichiro as an addresser and the reader as an addressee, that is, if Ichiro is demanding forgiveness from "you," the one who listens to this would then be put in the position of the State as such. In other words, it may appear that "you" as readers would be an embodiment of the People of the United States of America to the extent that "you" understand Ichiro as a *penitent* searching for your forgiveness. What is meant by the omnipresence of the State in this novel is not so much the thesis that everybody is under surveillance by the State's apparatuses. Rather it is the presence of "you" as the readers of this novelistic narrative, who receive Ichiro's address in such a manner that he is never allowed to speak unapologetically.

The narrative that is deployed along with such an asymmetrical interpersonal relationship is inevitably laced with many honorifics. Ichiro would speak to "you" from a lower position, in subordination, as if admitting your qualification as someone capable of forgiving him. Given such a power relationship, he would speak to satisfy your expectations and not offend your sensitivities. Therefore, from the outset, the narrator presents Ichiro's circumstances as if Ichiro has admitted his decision to refuse the draft to be one of utter conceit.

But for such a narrative tactic, how could he possibly talk about his refusal of military service *and* his and his family's internment in the camp at the same time? The words of Ichiro, the narrator and the novelistic text are enunciated in a network of censorship. In addition to the censorship practiced by governmental agencies such as those we have observed in the cases of *Road* and *Torrent*, the network includes the one imposed by people upon themselves; people who build their national solidarity on a blind endorsement of the patriotic imperative that one must devote one's life to the country, and who believe this endorsement to be the only communal ground upon which the narrator and the reader can communicate. Under such conditions neither Ichiro nor the narrator can evade the frequent use of honorific language, just as Scheherazade could not in *One Thousand and One Nights*, simply for the sake of postponing your philanthropic attention without which you would instantly withdraw from conversation. Let us not forget that this is the potential speaking positionality for the minority, one which minority intellectuals might appeal to under certain social and political conditions. Not only John Okada, author of *No-No Boy* but also Chin Kasen and O Shōyu had to occupy this speaking position. Just as Sei Nan in *Road*, is Ichiro to renegotiate his belonging to the nation in order to regain his self-esteem, which means embracing the State's call for self-sacrifice and, implicitly, the white

supremacy inherent in United States imperialism? Or, to put it differently, one of the crucial differences between *No-No Boy* and *Road* and *Torrent* is precisely this: while Okada was allowed to make Ichiro refuse, Chin Kasen was not allowed to let Sei Nan refuse to renegotiate his belonging to the nation in order to regain his crushed self-esteem.

Consequently, a certain ambiguity is implanted in these uses of honorific language in *No-No Boy*. In the first paragraph which touches upon the notion of Ichiro's sin, it is already detectable:

*The legs of his accuser were in front of him. God in a pair of green fatigues, U.S. Army style. They were the legs of the jury that had passed sentence upon him. Beseech me, they seemed to say, throw your arms about me and bury your head between my knees and seek pardon for your great sin. (4)*

This is an observation filled with the reminiscence ascribed to Ichiro in his encounter with Eto, another Japanese American. Eto believed he had become an authentic American because he had volunteered for military service and, for that reason, was entitled to despise Ichiro. He believed that he had regained his self-esteem, and that his affinity to national authenticity granted him the excuse to ostracize Ichiro.

What is in question in this peculiar use of the honorific? It is to tell Ichiro himself that one does not regain self-respect by increasing self-esteem. And it is to turn the form of confession into one in which the *penitent* interrogates the *confessor*. Thus, the story has to begin with the negation which Ichiro uttered against the judge who condemned him to imprisonment; it has to begin with Ichiro's "no" to the representative of the State.

Is this a confession in disguise, and manipulated by John Okada in order to lure you into a trap where it is not Ichiro's sin at stake but "yours" for interning the innocent American citizens of Japanese ancestry? If not termed a trap, should it be an invitation—somewhat hinted at in the kindness of Mr. Carrick, a character who is sympathetic enough to give Ichiro a job in the story—to conciliation between the American nation at large and the Japanese Americans in which, professing their own righteousness as well as admitting their own mistakes, each side forgives the other?

But, before trying to answer these questions, let us explore Okada's attempt to incorporate the actual conditions of Ichiro's linguistic situation. The Taiwanese situation in the early 1940s was drastically different from that of the United States, but in its constant but implicit appeal to the "national language" in the three texts, we can manage to remain attentive to the problematic of the dominant language in the two imperial nations.

Ichiro's parents are first-generation Japanese who cannot speak English adequately. Within his family the common language is still Japanese, but since the novel itself is written in English, this family's conversation is expressed in English just as conversation in Minnanhua (Taiwanese) was expressed in Japanese in *Road* and *Torrent*. It is feasible that his parents' words are translated in order to be integrated into this novelistic narrative. This means that at least some

part of *No-No Boy* was originally meant to be a translation, yet, this work being a fiction, for this translation there was no original.

The question that emerges is: can we then assume that the rest of this novel is *not* translation? Is it possible to draw a distinction between translation and the original in the case of this novel? Of course, I am not proposing an inquiry into John Okada's biography and his family genealogy. What is in question is whether or not it is possible to determine the mother tongue of Ichiro or the narrator, the very issue of determinability as to his mother tongue. (After Taiwan's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, O Shōyu worked to recover the original of *Torrent* in Chinese translation.<sup>18</sup> In this case too, the relationship between the published version and its original is ambiguous to say the least.) In *Torrent*, let us recall, Lin Bainien is depicted as a character who believed in his mother tongue and expressed his love of his mother in a language that was not his mother's.<sup>19</sup> But his uncle, Itō Haruo, may not have actually believed in his mother's tongue or his mother tongue. This issue was carefully left unsolved in *Torrent*. It could have been a generational dispute, between a generation for whom one's ethno-linguistic identity was given and another who need not take their "native language" as a source of their collective pride. As a *gongsheng*, successful candidate for the governmental examination of the Qing dynasty, did not Itō's father learn literary Chinese and write in this medium in which the determinability of his mother tongue could not be meaningfully raised (Ô Shōyu 245). This is precisely the reason why the destruction of literary styles and the *genbun'icchi* movement were absolutely necessary for the determinability of one's mother tongue to be addressed as an essential issue of ethnic nationalism.

Now let me shift our focus trans-pacifically from the western shore of the Pacific to its eastern shore. In light of the problematic of ethno-linguistic identity as a historical construct we cannot evade a new question: how can translation be distinguished from the original in *No-No Boy*? The distinction can be drawn only when a character is explicitly portrayed as having a particular national or ethnic language as her or his mother tongue. In modern literature, this character's and narrator's belonging to a national language is usually taken for granted. However, let me note the fact that this general assumption does not apply to *No-No Boy*.

Nearly all the paragraphs are supposedly in English. Except for scattered pockets of explicit translation, however, dominant in this text is the language of those who cannot have an exclusive relationship with a particular national or ethnic language. Their relationship to English is fundamentally unstable. Unlike James Joyce's, Chinua Achebe's and Teresa Cha's, Okada's writing does not manifest apparent multilingual features, yet this novelistic text cannot reproduce a clearcut distinction between the English and the Japanese, between one enclosed ethno-linguistic identity and another. There is no symmetrical scheme

<sup>18</sup> According to Chen Wanyi, there are three versions of *Torrent* in Chinese: a translation by Lin Zhonglong, one edited by the author himself, and a new translation by Zhong Zhaozheng.

<sup>19</sup> As far as Minnanhua is concerned, the situation has not changed much since then. Even today a Lin Hakunen (Lin Bainien) would not be able to express in writing his love of his mother in his mother's language.

between the two language unities here. Instead, the dialogue continues between those who dream of ultimately belonging to a language and those who no longer can. The most clearly marked as translation are the words of Ichiro's mother.

*Patiently, she waited until he had spoken. "Germans, Americans, accident, those things are not important. It was not the boy but the mother who is also the son and it is she who is to blame and it is she who is dead because the son did not know."*

*"I just know that Bob is dead."*

*"No, the mother. It is she who is dead because she did not conduct herself as a Japanese and, no longer being Japanese, she is dead."*

*"And the father? What about Mr. Kumasaka?"*

*"Yes, dead also."*

*"And you, Ma? What about you and Pa?"*

*"We are Japanese as always."*

*"And me?"*

*"You are my son who is also Japanese."*

*"That makes everything all right, does it? That makes it all right that Bob is dead, that war was fought and hundreds of thousands killed and maimed, and that I was two years in prison and am still Japanese?"*

*"Yes." (41-42)*

In which language is this conversation conducted? If in English, then the peculiarity of his mother's syntax should reflect her lack of fluency in the language. But, Ichiro was brought up by her who "opened [his] mouth and made [his] lips move to sound the words" (12). It would be much more persuasive and less inconsistent if the conversation is conducted in her national language. It would sound rather odd, in the same sense that Itô Haruo's utterances with the narrator's mother does. The grammatical irregularity of Ichiro's mother's utterances could indicate his uneasy relationship to his mother's language rather than her stilted rapport with English. What we perceive in her syntax is the distance that separates Ichiro from the language to which his mother believes she belongs, namely, from his mother's tongue.

Ichiro thinks that his dependence upon his mother's language "got [him] two years in prison" (12). For him, his mother's language is not primarily a technical problem concerning language acquisition; her stifling syntax suggests her attitude towards other languages and particularly the manner in which she figures

out her relation to the image of the United States society as a whole. One already discerns in this suffocating attitude a hint of her stubbornness and fixation which eventually lead her to suicide. It is an obsession with the naturalness of national/ethnic belonging and an ethno-linguistic identity; and the total denial of her life in the United States. Though it long preceded the age of the phototelegraphic facsimile, it was a sort of long distance nationalism based upon the schema of co-figuration. To the extent that she denies her Americanness, she has to idealize Japan as a negative of America. As a matter of fact, the content of her Japan is supplied with the inverted images of the Japanese stereotypes imposed upon Japanese Americans by mainstream America. The racial hierarchy of the United States and Japan is reproduced inversely in her national belonging.

The figure of Ichiro's mother forms the polar opposite of people like Eto who dreams of maintaining his ethnic pride by becoming "a good and loyal American." This opposition is then mapped onto the negation-affirmation axis. In this configuration, Ichiro's refusal of the draft could easily be explained away, in terms of the no-yes binary, as a rejection of assimilation and as a gesture of loyalty to his mother and her country. If his "no" is accommodated in this configuration, his confession which adds another "no" would then mean no more than a reversal, a conversion to affirmation through a double negation. The No-No Boy would then be nothing but the yes-man. He would be no more than a humiliated slave trying to regain his self-esteem by desperately seeking his master's recognition.

Ichiro refuses to endorse his mother's persistent denial of American life; he says "no" to her. Nevertheless, this negation of a return to Japan does not result in his return to America either.

*Was it she who was wrong and crazy not to have found in herself the capacity to accept a country which repeatedly refused to accept her or her sons unquestioningly, or was it the others who were being deluded, the ones, like Kenji, who believed and fought and even gave their lives to protect this country where they could still not rate as first-class citizens because of the unseen walls? (104)*

By now it is evident that ambiguity implanted in his confession prevents him from professing a coherent position with regard to his nationality and national belonging. It is not a trap; nor a disguise, either. The pursuit of national belonging cannot elude discriminatory violence either in the direction of his mother or Eto. His mother acquires the sense of national belonging at the cost of totally disavowing Japan's defeat and the death of loved ones. Similarly it is by deliberately overlooking the white supremacist biases inherent in United States' policies toward people of "alien origins" that Eto believes he will someday be an authentic American. Moreover, his blind faith in American nationalism, which reminds us of Itô Haruo's obsessive involvement in the Japanese National Spirit, is sustained by the public discrimination against unpatriotic Japanese American like Ichiro. By displacing the discriminatory and humiliating stare of the public fixed upon him onto a publicly marked outcast like Ichiro, Eto barely manages to uphold his sense of national belonging. What I notice here is an economy of

discriminatory identification with the nation, once referred to as “the transfer of oppression.”

*[T]he Negro who was always being mistaken for a white man becomes a white man and he becomes hated by the Negroes with whom he once hated on the same side. And the young Japanese hates the not-so-young Japanese who is more Japanese than himself, and the not-so-young, in turn, hates the old Japanese who is all Japanese and, therefore, even more Japanese than he.... (135-36)*

An individual is able to feel fully embraced in a nation only as long as he is confident that he is distinct from those who are unable to belong there. Yet, the definition of those who are unable to belong there is historically fluid and almost contingent. Discrimination against foreigners or those of “alien origins” is, therefore, a prerequisite for the sense of certainty in national belonging. Knowing that he would face his own death sooner or later, Kenji, a Japanese American character, who once attempted to become a “good and loyal American” by risking his own life, cannot conceal his sympathy with Ichiro. No doubt it is because Ichiro is free, even if not completely, of the obsessive desire for national identification. Kenji says to Ichiro,

*They think just because they went and packed a rifle they're different but they aren't and they know it. They're still Japs.... The guys who make it tough on you probably do so out of a misbegotten idea that maybe you're to blame because the good that they thought they were doing by getting killed and shot up doesn't amount to a pot of beans. (163)*

Risking one's own life for the country does not amount to a secure seat within it. One's desperate wish to be a fully integrated member of the nation will remain frustrated. And Ichiro speaks to himself:

*And what about the poor niggers on Jackson Street who can't find anything better to do than spit on the sidewalk and show me the way to Tokyo? They're on the outside looking in, just like that kid and just like me and just like everybody else I've ever seen or known. Even Mr. Carrick. Why isn't he in? Why is he on the outside squandering his goodness on outcasts like me? Maybe the answer is that there is no in. Maybe the whole damned country is pushing and shoving and screaming to get into someplace that doesn't exist, because they don't know that the outside could be the inside if only they would stop all this pushing and shoving and screaming, and they haven't got enough sense to realize that. (159-60)*

Nobody absolutely belongs to the nation; nobody is on the inside. Potentially everyone is a minority member. What is certain is that everyone tries to be in by expelling someone else.

## III

As goes without saying, the transfer of oppression operates differently in the social settings described in *Road*, *Torrent*, and *No-No Boy*. Yet, in spite of the different viewpoints from which personal animosity is described, one can observe in all these cases a certain mechanism by means of which the national whole maintains its equilibrium. "By exercising arbitrary power on those who are below, people manage to transfer in a downward direction the sense of oppression that comes from above, thus preserving the balance of the whole" (Maruyama 18). Maruyama Masao, renowned political scientist of wartime and postwar Japan, believed that the transfer of oppression was a trait particular to Japanese Ultra-nationalism, so he did not inquire into how this discriminatory mechanism operated together with the policies of integration promoted by the logic of the multi-ethnic State and deliberately evaded the questions of colonialism with which the formation of the national subject was closely connected. In other words, he failed to recognize the propinquity between the transfer of oppression and national belonging, the displacement of humiliation and the manufacture of the subject. In fact, Maruyama's analysis was a typical response by the *naichijin* (the Japanese proper) to the question of war responsibility after Japan's defeat. Whereas the *naichijin* had demanded the colonized in the annexed territories in the Empire to become "good and loyal Japanese" until just a few years earlier, he deliberately overlooked the fact that, soon after the collapse of the Empire, the Japanese of "alien origins" were deprived of their nationality and their fundamental political rights by official decrees.

In this respect, a much more politically savvy and theoretically insightful explanation than Maruyama's is given by Luke Gibbons about what often accompanies the coerced accommodation of the minority to the prevailing dominant ideology. In trying to provide some coherent elucidation as to why there have been many instances where "the humiliated of one culture become the shock troops of another, the ignominy of the slave prompting a need to retrieve dignity and self-respect by identifying with the master's voice and the very forces that gave rise to domination in the first place," Gibbons argues that the insidious logic of humiliation which always happens in the processes of colonization is that "it is only at the discretion of the perpetrator that the victim regains honour and pride" (94). Therefore, the minority, or the humiliated in these processes, had no other option but to "the alienation of one's self-image to another 'superior' or more powerful adversary." Gibbons writes,

*Redemption then takes the form of heroic self-immolation—the "voluntary" reenactment of the original ordeal which led to domination and humiliation. Thus, for example, the gory spectacle of gladiatorial combat in ancient Rome ... turned on a dramaturgy of sacrifice, in which despised slaves could regain their self-respect by audacious bravery, by staring defeat and annihilation in the face. (94-95)*

What was acted out by Sei Nan in *Road*, Itô Haruo in *Torrent*, and Eto in *No-No Boy* is this scenario of heroic self-immolation; the humiliated desperately perform

the expected role of a patriotic subject in order to recover their self-respect by gaining recognition from their masters. In the British Empire there thus emerged “the fearless (and fearsome) reputation of colonial cannon-fodder—the Scots, the Iroquois, the Irish, the Sikhs, the Gurkhas—in the heat of battle” (Gibbons 95). The United States has its own versions, with Unit 442 of the Japanese shock troops in the U.S. Army as probably being the most renowned case. What enchants the minority most in their frantic endeavor to redeem the sense of honor from the received humiliation is often an insatiable desire to display their self-destruction beyond the pleasure principle. This explains why the colonial foot-soldier so often ended up “doing the dirty work of empire, including his own self-destruction” and “the tragic paradox whereby the Irish or the Scots reserved their greatest rage and bloodlust for each other, or for those who resembled them most in battle” (Gibbons 95).

Not surprisingly what these three texts disclose unwittingly is that, under the threat of ostracism, minority individuals engage in such varying processes of negotiating about how they allow themselves to be accommodated in the prevailing dominant nationalism as in an egregious one whereby “the Irish ‘became white’ in the United States, compensating for their own indignities by buying into the very white supremacist attitudes which discriminated against them” (Gibbons 96). In reading these texts, the following remark by Gibbons is remarkably opportune:

*Accommodation with the prevailing dominant ideology—hybridity under hierarchical rule—is often akin to the resentment of the humiliated in Nietzsche’s terms, forced into outward shows of servility towards the humiliator who strikes them, but inwardly seething with resentment and the thirst for revenge. What is lacking in these circumstances is not the desire but the opportunity and weapons of resistance. But it is precisely this last line of defence—the domain of self-respect rather than the achievement ethic of self-esteem—which cultural humiliation seeks to extinguish, aiming for fully internalized loyalty to the dominant order so that the subject, literally, has no shame. (96)*

What is striking about *Torrent* and *No-No Boy* is that the authors describe the struggles of the humiliated along their “last line of defence”, and that, perhaps in spite of themselves, they seek to find some social space for “self-respect” rather than “the achievement ethic of self-esteem,” a space which could be sustained by neither identifying with “the master’s voice” or seeking recognition of those who humiliated them in the first place. By refusing an imaginary solution to the problem of the historical conditions they were caught in, they tried to *remain in shame*; they refused to be shameless.

Here let me briefly ponder over the conceptual distinction between self-respect and self-esteem, for which Luke Gibbons relies upon Avishai Margalit. With respect to a decent society where, in principle, people are to live without humiliation, a fundamental difference must be drawn between the concepts of self-respect and self-esteem even though both originally derive from affirmation

and respect entrusted to one by others. While self-respect demands that one be treated as an equal human by an other person, self-esteem is based upon the evaluation of one's achievement by others. My achievement is compared with others' and recognized as valuable by them, and then I gain self-esteem. Since self-respect is rooted in self-confidence and is not based upon the evaluation of my achievement, my self-respect cannot be shaken in my competition with others. On the one hand, I must earn, so to say, my self-esteem by displaying my achievement to those who evaluate me, so that I cannot evade being in competition. When I hold myself high in esteem, somebody else must be held low in esteem. If I am suffering from low self-esteem, some other person must be enjoying high self-esteem. Self-esteem is impossible in the system in which one does not compete with others. On the other hand, self-respect does not derive from any observable or meritorious trait such as qualification and achievement but rather from an unfounded—and anti-foundational—confidence that I will treat others as my equal human and others will treat me as their equal. Inherently self-respect is a matter of my attitude concerning the future. Margalit says, "[t]he attitude of others is built into the very concept of the value of humans which the bearer of self-respect is supposed to adopt with regard to herself" (125). Therefore, "[a]ny traits that might be used to justify respect are parasitic on our attitude toward human beings as human" (124). An empirically unfounded respect of others toward me serves as the support for my self-respect and self-confidence, and gives me courage to endlessly open myself toward others or to expose myself to others. What is called self-respect is this courageous action or what a seventeenth century Confucian scholar, Itô Jinsai, called *ai* (love or affection).

It is by destroying the very source of courage or *ai* that the experience of humiliation most deeply hurts a person. Precisely because self-respect is damaged, the victim of humiliation mistakes the recovery of self-esteem for the recovery of self-respect. Although self-respect derives from the existence of an other, I cannot recover my self-respect from others' immediate commendation or recognition. It might enhance my self-esteem, but I will continue to suffer from the loss of self-respect. Yet, in order to recover their self-respect, the logic of integration in imperial nationalism solicits minorities, who carry the burden of historical humiliation, to identify themselves with the colonial nation and commit themselves to their anticipatory death. According to national humanism, a human being is first of all a member of the nation-state; and judicially a non-national cannot be treated as a human being, so that only those who are qualified as members of the nation are capable of recovering self-respect as a "human being." But, the minorities are those who are potentially people of "alien origins" who could be deprived of their nationality just as the colonized from the annexed territories of the Japanese Empire actually were. The logic of national integration of the minorities in hierarchical hybridity may well promote the recovery of self-esteem; yet, in order to regain self-esteem, minority individuals would have to continue to parade their achievement and patriotic loyalty to the majority audience. This is why national integration in imperial nationalism would require a

scenario where the minorities act out their expected role to fulfill the desire of the majority.

Now what is allegorically invested in the figure of Ichirô, the protagonist of *No-No Boy*, should be evident: against all the odds of Imperial Nationalism it is to wager a counter-scenario that a minority individual can hold onto her or his self-respect. Instead of accumulating patriotic allegiance to the nation, one could recover one's self-respect by refusing to yield to the majority's self-justification. For this refusal, of course, Ichiro is exposed to the humiliating violence of the State and denied a belonging to the nation. Nevertheless, he will not relinquish his self-respect, thereby pointing out the possibility that a minority individual can evade becoming "fully internaliz[ing] loyalty to the dominant order."

*No-No Boy* was published twelve years after Japan's defeat and retrospectively offered a critical alternative to the dominant scenario of national integration put forth by imperial nationalisms during the Asia-Pacific and Second World War. Unlike *Road* by Chin Kasen and *Torrent* by Ô Shôyu, it was not written under tight censorship in the wartime state of emergency. In *No-No Boy* the fictive nature of its narrative consists in the retrospective alternative hypothesis: what would I have done if I had been able to respond to the historical conditions otherwise than I actually did? Understandably the majority of the Japanese-American community in the United States were hostile to this publication and accordingly ignored it, perceiving in this fiction an insult to their loyalty and national belonging which they had managed to internalize according to the scenario of national integration by a imperial nationalism.

Furthermore, *No-No Boy* speaks of an irreparable history, adheres to the historical experience of the people of Japanese ancestry in the United States during the war, and is part of a singular history that cannot be generalized. But what was disclosed through his obsession to repeat this past experience of the concentration camp in a fictional narrative was an event of encounter in which a minority individual struggles to survive tremendous humiliation without giving up his own self-respect. The story tells us that some minorities do refuse to give up their self-respect even if they are deprived of national belonging. Whether or not it effectively undermines the logic of the *poiesis* of the subject of minority people according to such universalism as the "Logic of the Species" has yet to be examined.

#### Works Cited

- Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
- Balibar, Étienne. "Les identités ambiguës." *La crainte des masses*, Paris, Galilée, 1997. 353-69.
- Bidet, Jacques. *Théorie générale*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.

- Chen Wanyi. "Yume to genjitsu [Dream and Reality]." *Yomigaeru Taiwan Bungaku: Nihon Tōchi-jiki no Sakka to Sakuhin* [Resurrecting Taiwanese Literature]. Ed. Shimomura Sakujirō, Nakajima Toshio, Fujii Shōzō, and Huang Yintso. Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1995. 389-406.
- Chen Yingzhen. "Imperial Army Betrayed." *Perilous Memories: The Asia Pacific War(s)*. Ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama. Durham: Duke UP, 2001. 181-98.
- Chin, Kasen. *Michi* [Road]. *Bungei Taiwan* (June 1943).
- Ching, Leo. "Give Me Japan and Nothing Else! Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism." *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, ed. Tomiko Yoda and Harry Harootunian (Fall 2000): 763-88.
- Chō, Bunkan (Zhāng Wenhuan). "Iyatumu ge." *Taiwan Bungaku*, vol. 2 (1942): 63-102.
- Chow, Rey. "The Dream of a Butterfly." *Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. 74-97.
- Daitōa Kensetsu-ron* [On the construction of the Greater East Asia]. Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Tokyo: Shōkō Gyōseisha, 1943.
- Drobisch, Klaus, and Günter Wieland. *System der NS-Konzentrations-lager 1933-39*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993.
- Gibbons, Luke. "Guests of the Nation: Ireland, Immigration, and Post-Colonial Solidarity." "Race" *Panic and the Memory of Migration*. Ed. Meaghan Morris and Brett de Bary. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2001. 79-102.
- Hamada, Hayao. "Shōsetsu 'Michi' ni tsui." *Bungei Taiwan* (June 1943): 142.
- Higuchi, Yūichi. *Kōgunheishi ni sareta chōsenjin: Jūgonen Sensō ka no Sōdoin taisei no kenkyū* [Koreans who were turned into Japanese Imperial soldiers]. Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1991.
- Hirota, Masaki. "Epilogue." *Sabetsu no shoso*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990. 436-516.
- Kang, Duk-sang. *Chōsenjin gakuto shutsujin: mō hitotsu no wadatsum no koe* [Korean volunteer student soldiers]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997.
- Komagome, Takeshi. *Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka tōgō* [Cultural integration in the Japanese colonial empire]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- Margalit, Avishai. *The Decent Society*. Trans. Naomi Goldblum. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996.

- Maruyama, Masao. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. Ed. Ivan Morris. London: Oxford UP, 1963.
- Miyata, Setsuko. *Chôsen minshû to kôminka-seisaku* [The Korean masses and imperialization policies]. Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985.
- Nishikawa, Mitsuru. "Shôsetsu 'Michi' ni tsui." *Bungei Taiwan* (June 1943): 142.
- Ô Shôyu (Wang, Changxiang). *Honryû* [Torrent]. Reprint in *Gaichi no nihongo bungaku sen*, vol. 1. Ed. Kurokawa Sou. Tokyo: Shinjuku shobo, 1996.
- . *Honryû* [Torrent]. Trans. Lin Zhonglong. *Guangfuqian Taiwan Wenshue Quanji* [Works of Taiwanese Literature before the Liberation]. Vol. 8. Taipei: Yuanjing Chuban, 1979.
- . *Honryû* [Torrent]. Ed. Ô Shôyu. *Taiwan Zuoqia Quanji-Weng Nao, Wu Yongfu, & Wang Changxiang* [Works of Taiwanese Authors, Weng Nao, Wu Yongfu, & Wang Changxiao]. Vol. 6. Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 1991.
- . *Honryû* [Torrent]. Trans. Zhong Zhaozheng. *Rijushidai Taiwan Shaoxuexuan* [Selected Novels of the Japanese Occupation Period]. Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 1992.
- Okada, John. *No-No Boy*. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1979.
- Sakai, Naoki. "Hutatsu no hitei: No-No-Boy wo yomu [Two Negations: A Reading of *No-No-Boy*]." *Shisô no Kagaku* 125 (1990): 114-26. Reprinted in *Shisan sareru Nigongo-Nigonjin* [The Stillbirth of the Japanese]. Tokyo: Shinyô-sha, 1996. 99-126.
- . "Nihonjin dearu koto: taminzoku kokka ni okeru kokumin shutai no kôchiku no mondai to tanabe hajime no 'shu no ronri' [Being Japanese: the problem of the construction of a national subject in a multi-ethnic state and Tanabe Hajime's 'Logic of the Species']." *Shisô* 882 (1997): 5-48. English translation: "Subject and Substratum: on Japanese Imperial Nationalism." *Cultural Studies* 14 (2000): 462-530.
- . *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997.
- Tanabe Hajime, "Shi sei [Death and life]." *Tanabe Hajime Zenshu*, vol. 8. Tokyo: Chikuma shobô, 1963. 243-62.
- United States. National Security Council. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Sept. 2002. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>>.

# Contributors

NAOKI SAKAI is Professor of Comparative Literature and Asian Studies at Cornell University, and Senior Editor of the multi-lingual journal *Traces*, published in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and English. His publications include *Voices of the Past: The Status of Language in 18<sup>th</sup>-Century Japanese Discourse* (Cornell UP, 1991), *Translation and Subjectivity* (U of Minnesota P, 1997), *Shisan saren hihongo nihonjin (Stillbirth of the Japanese)* (Shinyô-sha, 1996), and many others.

KWAI-CHEUNG LO teaches in the Department of English Language and Literature at Baptist University, Hong Kong. He recently published *Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong* (U of Illinois P, 2005).

RITA BARNARD is Associate Professor of English and Director of Women's Studies and the Alice Paul Center for Research on Women and Gender at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of *The Great Depression and the Culture of Abundance* (Cambridge UP, 1995) and *Apartheid Literature and the Politics of Place* (Oxford UP, forthcoming).

GENE JARRETT is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Maryland, College Park. His article here is part of a larger monograph, recently completed, about race, realism, and the historical "problem" of African American literature. Related articles have appeared in *Nineteenth-Century Literature* and are forthcoming in *PMLA* and *Southern Literary Journal*. He is editor of *African American Literature Beyond Race: An Alternative Reader* (NYU P, forthcoming), and co-editor of *New Negro Criticism: Essays on Race, Representation, and African American Culture* (Princeton UP, forthcoming) and *The Complete Stories of Paul Laurence Dunbar* (Ohio UP, forthcoming).

SANJAY KRISHNAN is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania.

JOHN PLOTZ is Associate Professor of English at Brandeis University and author of *The Crowd: British Literature and Public Politics* (U of California P, 2000). ANN ARDIS is Professor of English at the University of Delaware. She is author of *Modernism and Cultural Conflict, 1880-1922* (Cambridge UP, 2002) and co-editor of *Women's Experience of Modernity, 1875-1945* (Johns Hopkins UP, 2002). RAVIT REICHMAN is Assistant Professor of English at Brown University. MEG ALBRINCK is Assistant Professor of English and Chair of General Studies at Lakeland College. BEVERLY LYON CLARK is Meneely Professor of English at Wheaton College and author of *Kiddie Lit: The Cultural Construction of Children's Literature in America* (Johns Hopkins UP, 2003). LYN PYKETT is Professor of English and ProVice-Chancellor at the University of Wales. She is author of *Engendering Fictions: The English Novel in the Early Twentieth Century* (Edward Arnold, 1995) and *Charles Dickens* (Palgrave, 2002), and Editor of the *Journal of Victorian Culture*. SCOTT J. JUENGL is Assistant Professor of English at Michigan State University.